The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Trust and commitment in collective testimony

Trust and commitment in collective testimony
Trust and commitment in collective testimony
In this paper I critically discuss Miranda Fricker’s ‘trust-based’ view of collective testimony—that is, testimony that comes from a group speaker. At the heart of Fricker’s account is the idea that testimony involves an ‘interpersonal deal of trust’, to which the speaker contributes a commitment to ‘second-personal epistemic trustworthiness’. Appropriating Margaret Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment, Fricker suggests that groups too can make such commitments, and hence that they, like individuals, can ‘enter into the second-personal relations of trust that characterise testimony’ (Fricker, Philos Phenomenol Res 84:272, 2012). I argue that this choice to appropriate Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment betrays a deep problem in Fricker’s account—a misconstrual of both the object and the subject(s) of the commitment a speaker makes in testifying. After developing this criticism, I outline an alternative way of construing the speaker’s commitment, which can be applied to both collective and individual testimony.

39 - 58
Springer
Townsend, Leo
8f4f19b2-8d93-4ce5-a772-56a758369dc0
Townsend, Leo
8f4f19b2-8d93-4ce5-a772-56a758369dc0

Townsend, Leo (2020) Trust and commitment in collective testimony. In, Groups, Norms and Practices. Springer, 39 - 58. (doi:10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_3).

Record type: Book Section

Abstract

In this paper I critically discuss Miranda Fricker’s ‘trust-based’ view of collective testimony—that is, testimony that comes from a group speaker. At the heart of Fricker’s account is the idea that testimony involves an ‘interpersonal deal of trust’, to which the speaker contributes a commitment to ‘second-personal epistemic trustworthiness’. Appropriating Margaret Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment, Fricker suggests that groups too can make such commitments, and hence that they, like individuals, can ‘enter into the second-personal relations of trust that characterise testimony’ (Fricker, Philos Phenomenol Res 84:272, 2012). I argue that this choice to appropriate Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment betrays a deep problem in Fricker’s account—a misconstrual of both the object and the subject(s) of the commitment a speaker makes in testifying. After developing this criticism, I outline an alternative way of construing the speaker’s commitment, which can be applied to both collective and individual testimony.

This record has no associated files available for download.

More information

Published date: 2 December 2020

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 495346
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/495346
PURE UUID: c47cc39b-b34a-4668-86ad-14ae04202bd9
ORCID for Leo Townsend: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-5992-162X

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 11 Nov 2024 17:54
Last modified: 12 Nov 2024 03:17

Export record

Altmetrics

Contributors

Author: Leo Townsend ORCID iD

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×