The affective preconditions of inquiry: Hookway on doubt, altruism and self-confidence

Williams, Neil W. (2023) The affective preconditions of inquiry: Hookway on doubt, altruism and self-confidence. In, Talisse, Robert, Cárdenas, Paniel Reyes and Herbert, Daniel (eds.) Pragmatic Reason: Christopher Hookway and the American Philosophical Tradition. 1 ed. Routledge. (doi:10.4324/9781003165699).

Abstract

One of the major contributions which Christopher Hookway has made to pragmatist epistemology is a critical exploration of the role that affective dispositions play in inquiry.

According to Hookway, a well-functioning rational inquirer must rely upon a set of pre-reflective and affective dispositions which are not themselves fully available to rational evaluation. Despite their pre-reflective nature, on the pragmatist account, these affective dispositions provide us with judgments and evaluations which are in many cases more reliable than those provided by explicit rational reflection. This chapter presents and defends Hookway’s account of the epistemic importance of our affective dispositions. The first section presents three roles that affective dispositions play within inquiry. The second section considers the concern that affective dispositions should be considered impositions upon our epistemic agency. In response, Hookway suggests that we must identify with our affective dispositions, and two interpretations of this claim are offered. The third section considers the possibility that the confidence we have in our affective dispositions might be appropriately shaken if we recognize that they are not shared by other inquirers. The chapter concludes by suggesting that Hookway’s position can overcome this worry by developing his notion of critical self-trust in three distinct ways.

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Contributors

Author: Neil W. Williams

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