High-status lobbyists are most likely to overrate their success
High-status lobbyists are most likely to overrate their success
Overconfidence helps individuals reach higher status within social groups by making them seem more competent regardless of objective ability, so this bias may be especially prevalent among status-oriented members of elite communities. Based on this premise, we explore whether lobbyists in the USA misperceive their success. Using models that (1) control for legislative outcome when predicting self-assessed policy success and (2) compare self-assessed policy success on specific proposals against the average success reported by all lobbyists working on the same side of an issue, we identify systematic tendencies to overrate achievements. Lobbyists with higher incomes, who reside in Washington, DC, USA, have congressional experience and who engage in a broader range of activities are more likely to overrate their success. Public interest group lobbyists tend to underestimate success. We conclude that political elites are subject to the same biases as others when evaluating their performance, and these biases may be largely status-driven.
153-159
Lyons, Benjamin A
4c85428f-bd28-4aa1-b53b-282c9918fea6
McKay, Amy Melissa
e7f1cbfc-0aa2-45f8-a85b-69cb025461ca
Reifler, Jason
426301a1-f90b-470d-a076-04a9d716c491
4 November 2020
Lyons, Benjamin A
4c85428f-bd28-4aa1-b53b-282c9918fea6
McKay, Amy Melissa
e7f1cbfc-0aa2-45f8-a85b-69cb025461ca
Reifler, Jason
426301a1-f90b-470d-a076-04a9d716c491
Lyons, Benjamin A, McKay, Amy Melissa and Reifler, Jason
(2020)
High-status lobbyists are most likely to overrate their success.
Nature Human Behaviour, 4, .
(doi:10.1038/s41562-019-0761-9).
Abstract
Overconfidence helps individuals reach higher status within social groups by making them seem more competent regardless of objective ability, so this bias may be especially prevalent among status-oriented members of elite communities. Based on this premise, we explore whether lobbyists in the USA misperceive their success. Using models that (1) control for legislative outcome when predicting self-assessed policy success and (2) compare self-assessed policy success on specific proposals against the average success reported by all lobbyists working on the same side of an issue, we identify systematic tendencies to overrate achievements. Lobbyists with higher incomes, who reside in Washington, DC, USA, have congressional experience and who engage in a broader range of activities are more likely to overrate their success. Public interest group lobbyists tend to underestimate success. We conclude that political elites are subject to the same biases as others when evaluating their performance, and these biases may be largely status-driven.
This record has no associated files available for download.
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 23 September 2019
Published date: 4 November 2020
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 497038
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/497038
ISSN: 2397-3374
PURE UUID: b22e9326-7a05-48ec-9cec-41453cbda46b
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 10 Jan 2025 17:46
Last modified: 21 Jan 2025 03:15
Export record
Altmetrics
Contributors
Author:
Benjamin A Lyons
Author:
Amy Melissa McKay
Author:
Jason Reifler
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics