The effect of fact-checking on elites: A field experiment on U.S. state legislators
The effect of fact-checking on elites: A field experiment on U.S. state legislators
Does external monitoring improve democratic performance? Fact-checking has come to play an increasingly important role in political coverage in the United States, but some research suggests it may be ineffective at reducing public misperceptions about controversial issues. However, fact-checking might instead help improve political discourse by increasing the reputational costs or risks of spreading misinformation for political elites. To evaluate this deterrent hypothesis, we conducted a field experiment on a diverse group of state legislators from nine U.S. states in the months before the November 2012 election. In the experiment, a randomly assigned subset of state legislators was sent a series of letters about the risks to their reputation and electoral security if they were caught making questionable statements. The legislators who were sent these letters were substantially less likely to receive a negative fact-checking rating or to have their accuracy questioned publicly, suggesting that fact-checking can reduce inaccuracy when it poses a salient threat.
628-640
Nyhan, Brendan
76e1ec80-0af5-432d-9dd6-f7e8237191e4
Reifler, Jason
426301a1-f90b-470d-a076-04a9d716c491
July 2015
Nyhan, Brendan
76e1ec80-0af5-432d-9dd6-f7e8237191e4
Reifler, Jason
426301a1-f90b-470d-a076-04a9d716c491
Nyhan, Brendan and Reifler, Jason
(2015)
The effect of fact-checking on elites: A field experiment on U.S. state legislators.
American Journal of Political Science, 59 (3), .
(doi:10.1111/ajps.12162).
Abstract
Does external monitoring improve democratic performance? Fact-checking has come to play an increasingly important role in political coverage in the United States, but some research suggests it may be ineffective at reducing public misperceptions about controversial issues. However, fact-checking might instead help improve political discourse by increasing the reputational costs or risks of spreading misinformation for political elites. To evaluate this deterrent hypothesis, we conducted a field experiment on a diverse group of state legislators from nine U.S. states in the months before the November 2012 election. In the experiment, a randomly assigned subset of state legislators was sent a series of letters about the risks to their reputation and electoral security if they were caught making questionable statements. The legislators who were sent these letters were substantially less likely to receive a negative fact-checking rating or to have their accuracy questioned publicly, suggesting that fact-checking can reduce inaccuracy when it poses a salient threat.
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e-pub ahead of print date: 27 October 2014
Published date: July 2015
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Local EPrints ID: 497088
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/497088
ISSN: 0092-5853
PURE UUID: cc35df0e-96d3-4b94-a1fc-5dc79bad66bc
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Date deposited: 14 Jan 2025 16:08
Last modified: 18 Jan 2025 03:21
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Author:
Brendan Nyhan
Author:
Jason Reifler
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