**Wicked Politics and Trashy Economics: Gender and Scandalous Expertise**

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**ABSTRACT**

Who gets to speak with authority about the economy?Countering problematic identity-blindness, we develop a framework for exploring how identity designates whose economic expertise is perceived as authentic and authoritative according to the intersectional exclusions of gender, race and class. These exclusionary power dynamicsare key to a fuller understandingofthe politics of economic expertise, shaping not only who gets to speak with authority about the economy, but also how the economy is conceptualised through models and methods that exclude the full range of economic activity from analysis and debate. We apply these insights to the case of Brexit, and the performance of economic expertise during and after the referendum campaign, focusing on two bodies – Economists for Free Trade (EFT) and the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).

**Keywords:** Feminist political economy; gendered economic expertise regime; identity; Brexit discourse; Economists for Free Trade (EFT); Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)

**Introduction**

*Project Fear was a gross miscarriage of government…Perhaps there was a mixture of malice and ignorance, of wicked politics and trashy economics…At any rate, the debate about the long-run benefits and costs of Brexit is open. Some of us…will remain optimistic.*

Tim Congdon, Economists for Free Trade, 4th December 2018

Writing to the Treasury Select Committee at the height of Britain’s parliamentary Brexit debate, Tim Congdon of pro-Brexit pressure group *Economists for Free Trade (EFT)* leveraged a familiar argument about economic expertise (Congdon, 2018). Whereas the Remain establishment’s ‘Project Fear’ represented the might of the government machine, supported by the Treasury and other doom-mongers intent on talking Britain down (Congdon, 2018), only Congdon’s marginalised group of economists had the technical know-how to support their positive vision for post-Brexit Britain (Minford, 2016a).

Congdon saw a combination of ‘wicked politics and trashy economics’ in remain-sympathisers reinforcing their elite status, disregarding EFT’s superior ‘scientific’ work. Congdon’s scandalised claims about EFT’s marginalisation are fallacious. EFT’s views *were* frequently courted in the UK media and Parliament during the Brexit campaign and the post-referendum debate (Rosamond, 2020). That said, there was indeed something ‘truly scandalous’ (Hozić & True, 2016, 19) about how economic Brexit expertise both obscured and perpetuated structural inequalities. Put simply, scandals:

[D]ivert attention from the (typically male) elite culprits and unequal social relations…they obfuscate the distributional consequences of [Brexit] for different groups in society; and they exploit women (leaders) and gender equality in the restoration of a nationalist, austerity society (Hozić & True, 2017, 275).

Scandals reveal something important about economic expertise, about what it means to be ‘an expert’ (Galpin & Vernon, 2023). The economics profession, so frequently invited to pronounce on Brexit’s impacts, remains dominated by a narrow sub-set of society, typically ‘a white, well-educated man, usually in a suit’ (O’Dwyer, 2019, 164). The privileged position of this group, animated by intersectional exclusions of gender, race and class, colours what we expect authoritative economic expertise to look like, with potentially profound political and policy implications. If expertise, and the very conception of 'the economy' it assumes, is confined to a narrow demographic then the emergent political project and associated policy choices are likely equally exclusionary (Achilleos-Sarll & Martill, 2019; Hozić & True, 2016, 2017; O’Dwyer, 2019). Yet most research on the politics of economic expertise remains ‘identity-blind’ (Hozić & True, 2017, 281).

Disparities between the identities of those involved in, and those affected by, economic decision-making shape *how* such decisions are made. The very models and methods that economists deploy exhibit gendered assumptions about ‘the economy’, which exclude informal economic activities (Hozić and True 2016, 7; Steans 1999; Peterson 2005; Griffin 2013; Bedford & Rai 2010), reinforce the public-private divide and defer to calculative logics that reflect long-standing stereotypes about men’s superior capacity to ‘do science’ (O’Dwyer, 2019, 168). While ‘the political and social choices of elite, male, decision makers become masked by an allegedly neutral system of technical imperatives and interests’ (Hooper, 2001, 163), mathematical techniques also confer masculinised qualities of independence, expertise and objectivity, which convey authority (O’Dwyer, 2019, 165).

This underlines a scandal of economic Brexit expertise. Congdon’s EFT fit the exclusive stereotypical economist profile; so too did the expert institutions EFT critiqued. The technocratic reason of these bodies is emblematic of their masculinised culture (Hooper, 2001), apparent in their macroeconomic concepts that overlook, for example, the gendered burdens and value of unpaid work (Hozić & True, 2016, 4, 7; Waring 1999). Such heuristics render an abstracted view of ‘the economy’ wherein ‘labor has no actual body’, ’no home’, and remains ‘colorless as in white, and sexless as in male’ (Eisenstein, 2014 cited in Hozić and True 2016, 4). This is the wicked politics and trashy economics of Brexit our article explores.

We highlight how identity crucially defines and legitimises economic expertise, following Gamble’s encouragement to think in ‘broader analytical terms of [how] the economic is constituted by power relationships expressed through gender, race, class and identity’ (2021, 283; see also O’Dywer, 2018; 2019; Galpin & Vernon, 2023; Fukuda-Parr *et al* 2013). Our intersectional analysis of the social nature of economic expertise focuses on and explores these power relations and exclusions, countering problematic identity-blindness in many studies in political economy and economic sociology. Our findings, we argue, resonate with other areas of expertise in public policy and public life, including socio-ecological crisis and climate denialism, and the mobilisation of scientific expertise in pandemic response. Further identity-based work could explore the different modes of discourse deployed in these realms, and whether similar kinds of exclusions, and superficial forms of ‘alternative’ expertise, are manifest.

Our article qualitatively analyses two groups of economists whose expertise prevailed during the Brexit debate. Our two-fold research design involves firstly, close reading of these groups’ primary documents, to excavate their underlying assumptions and discursive strategies. After consulting a wide range of sources, we conducted a detailed analysis of a few representative ones per group – major reports, interventions, or speeches. Secondly, we reviewed the curricula vitae of each group’s members, analysing their professional trajectories and reported domains of expertise (Ban & Patenaude 2019; Rosamond 2020). These results are reported in full in Appendices 1 and 2.

The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) is selected as an archetype of technocratic expertise. Its work drew upon and exemplified mainstream economic forecasting of Brexit’s effects. EFT is selected as the highest profile, most vocal exponent of the contrary, pro-Brexit view. Each group emerges from particular institutional and historical constellations that continue to shape their conduct.

Our argument proceeds in five steps. First, we explore the politics of expertise literature and speaking with authority about the economy. Second, our analytical framework explores identity’s role in designating whose expertise is deemed authoritative. In sections three and four we apply this framework to the OBR and EFT. Each used distinctive masculinised discursive styles to express their arguments, underpinned by different intellectual aims. In section five we explore how both groups shared problematic, exclusionary Gross Domestic Product (GDP)-centred understandings of ‘the economy’. We conclude by considering how the debate could have been conducted differently.

**Speaking with authority about the economy: the scandalous politics of economic expertise**

Constructing economic policy knowledge is a social process, wherein authoritative voices can shape others’ perceptions of sensible economic policy conduct (see Clift, 2018, 1–8, 15–18). The capacity to speak with authority about the economy and Britain’s possible economic futures is an important site of power. Those who can make authoritative knowledge claims, such as prominent economists and expert economic institutions, enjoy a privileged position.

Recognised economic experts can frame an economic problem in ways that suggest certain responses, or ‘resolutions’ to perceived ‘crises’ (O’Dwyer, 2019). Experts’ ‘causal ideas and normative beliefs’ provide ‘navigable scripts’ and ‘valid solution sets’; with expert economic ideas ‘themselves the source of collective understandings of the very problems that need resolution’ (Rosamond, 2020, 1086). Expertise is inherently political, generating a ‘distinctive field of knowledge and practice’, producing both policy and subjectivity (Melhuish & Heath-Kelly, 2022, 314).

We add to these long-standing insights on the politics of expertise in two ways. Firstly, we highlight how the question of who counts as an expert is both open and narrow. Open because expert status is not solely conferred on the basis of academic or professional credentials (see appendices). Narrow because expert economist status entails exclusive performances of identity, a factor notably overlooked in the literature.

Secondly, we use an intersectional feminist lens (Crenshaw, 1991; Collins & Bilge, 2020; MacKinnon, 2013) to underline biases, marginalisations and silences entailed in Brexit’s ‘scandalous’ politics of economics expertise (Hozic & True, 2016). O’Dwyer has already analysed the ‘gendered nature of economic expertise’ in European economic governance (2019, 2022a). Studies have outlined exclusionary contours of Brexit-specific expertise and the lack of women’s voices (e.g. Galpin, 2018; Galpin & Vernon, 2023; Guerrina et al., 2018; Guerrina & Masselot, 2021; Haastrup et al., 2019a, 2019b). Women were sparingly heard within a ‘gender silo’ of so-called ‘women’s issues’ (Guerrina et al., 2018, 255), but omitted from discussions of Brexit’s impact on key masculinised areas like trade and security (Haastrup et al., 2019b, 65). Women experts were more likely to receive abuse than their male counterparts (Galpin, 2018). These effects, as with the broader impact of Brexit, were compounded for identities that were also racialised and classed (Galpin & Vernon, 2023; Haastrup et al., 2019a, 312).

Speaking with authority about the economy is shaped by power relations of gender, race and class (Benería, 1999; Galpin & Vernon, 2023; Griffin, 2013). The Brexit debate exemplifies a ‘gendered expertise regime’ (O’Dwyer, 2019; Azocar & Ferree 2015), reflecting dominant ideas about ‘who is considered an expert and what kind of expertise is valued’ (Guerrina et al., 2018, 255; see also Hannah et al., 2021; Galpin & Vernon, 2023). Its ‘system of knowing reifies elite men’ (Guerrina et al., 2018, 255), conforming to the white, male, ‘public image of the expert’ (O’Dwyer, 2019, 164). Consequently, ‘[white] male-ness is itself an implicit appeal to expert authority’, legitimising and sustaining ‘gender-blind policymaking’ and discourse (O’Dwyer, 2019, 165, 169).

While an economic model’s general assumptions introduce biases into Brexit projections (Siles-Brügge 2019; Rosamond 2020; Clift 2023b), this is only part of the story. More fundamentally, the founding premises of economics knowledge and analysis – about what counts as ‘the economy’, what counts as an expert – all construe the world, and the issue of Brexit, in exclusionary ways (Peterson 2005). Our analytical framework explores this relationship between identity and economic expertise.

**Two modes of economic expertise: an identity-based analytical framework**

We interrogate how gender, race and class shape economic expertise and discourse, developing an identity-based analytical framework that captures both the similarities and differences between dominant groups of white male experts. Discussing identity risks reducing complex power relations to personal characteristics (Collins & Bilge 2020, Chapter 8). Identity is only one way of understanding how certain forms of expertise come to prevail. Gender, race and class also operate at a structural level: one cannot assume that simply including more women in mainstream political economic discourse will automatically lead to more inclusive, gender-sensitive policy debate, in content or tenor (Celis & Childs, 2020). We therefore also remain attentive to how historical systems of power, particularly empire, continue to shape identities and expertise (Collins & Bilge 2020, Chapter 8).

However, we argue that white male identity is central to economic expertise being deemed authoritative and authentic. Our identity-based framework provides novel insights into how exclusionary assumptions about ‘the economy’ ensue from this subject position, and how they are shared across the expert spectrum, with serious implications for forecasting Brexit’s impact. Despite these commonalities, we also argue that the debate was characterised by two gendered *modes* of expertise, with distinctive discursive styles.

These two modes can be analysed using the idea of the expert 'avatar' (Mudge and Vauchez 2012, Rosamond 2020), underlining the superficial quality of EFT’s ‘alternative’ expertise, compared with (more credible, yet still problematic) mainstream analyses. The overtly ideologically-driven and politically networked EFT avatar is a ‘hired gun’ economist who ‘supplies advice for and advocacy on behalf of particular interests’ (Rosamond 2020, 1099; cf. Goodwin 1988). Other ideal-typical economists are the ‘philosopher’ (often an academic) and the ‘priest’ (typically a public policy official). We conceptualise OBR technocrats as members of the economic priesthood. While the priest may apply knowledge generated by the philosopher to tackle ‘real word’ issues and address broad audiences, the hired gun will invoke the priest’s ‘homilies’, or the underlying philosopher’s ‘scripture/theology’, but ‘when (and only when) those can be articulated to the advocacy claim in question’ (Rosamond, 2020, 1099).

Identity is already implicit here since both the priest and hired gun can be located on a spectrum of masculinity. While the image of the priest suggests a masculinity that is conservative and moralising, the hired gun conjures a cavalier and mercenary masculine identity. Each evokes the image of a white man, consistent with the organisational characteristics of the OBR and EFT. We unpack these features further below, considering also how institutional and historical structures continue to shape each organisation.

Identity is also pertinent to the expert *avatar*. Beginning from the contention that identity is not fixed but aesthetically conveyed or ‘performed’ (Butler, 1990), we draw here on visual politics scholarship (Berger, 2013; Grainge, 2000) to unpack the gendered and racialised qualities of authority and authenticity (O’Dwyer, 2018, 2019; Rai, 2015), upon which all prevailing forms of economic expertise depend. In online vernacular, avatars are a facsimile of an underlying original. They are usually a cartoon figure that a person uses to represent themselves in digital spaces. While they may be a good likeness, they can never quite capture the ‘real thing’. Relations of superficiality and authenticity evoke work on memory and nostalgia where authenticity links conceptually to ‘the idea and possibility of fraud’, prompting a quest for ‘representational authenticity’ through nostalgic monochrome images (Grainge, 2000, 76, 160). This visual marker of authenticity is used to convey credibility, drawing on the idea that black and white photographs can reliably capture a lost past (Grainge, 2000, 76; Berger, 2013). Yet for some, the monochromatic representation of the past in the present can only ever offer ‘a pure simulation of authenticity’ (Grainge, 2000, 93).

‘Simulated authenticity’ is also at work in the visual politics of economic expertise. White maleness is central to the performance of authority, and the perception of authenticity: attributes which reinforce one another (Rai, 2015, 1185). White masculinities are racialised in ways that enable them to appear ‘the norm’ (Baker & Levon, 2016, 15; Puwar, 2001). The British Empire created a social order with white male colonial rulers governing a hierarchy of colonised ‘Others’ (Puwar, 2001, 655). Thanks to this history, contemporary whiteness is ‘transparent’, conveying as ‘self-evident’ its body’s abilities, ‘full humanity’ (Shilliam, 2017, 293; Achilleos-Sarll, 2022, 344), and thus authority. Masculinities constructed during empire compound these attributes (Morgensen, 2015). White men are simply assumed to possess ‘authentic’ markers of ‘manliness’ such as controlled ‘physicality’, ‘ambition’ (Baker & Levon, 2016, 109, 117), and rationality (Wright, 2021, 158). Put simply, ‘whites are differentiated and defined by what they are not’ (Puwar, 2001, 655): feminised, non-white ‘Others’ variously presented as irrational, emotionally excessive or aggressive (Baker & Levon, 2016; Achilleos-Sarll, 2022, 343).

Despite key differences in their qualifications, which we discuss below, the visual status of both the expert (OBR) and its avatar (EFT) as white men marked them as competent, authoritative and authentic economists. Yet our identity-based analytical framework also highlights the diversity of discursive modes for conveying this expertise. EFT as ‘hired gun’ (Rosamond, 2020) display a form of ‘hypermasculinity’, which shares features with ‘machonomics’: a ‘hegemonic “I know best” masculinity’, typically exhibited by white male proponents in discourses of ‘self-certainty’ (Watson, 2017, 536–538). EFT machonomics promotes political bullshit (O’Dwyer, 2018), shunning discursive triangulation with the truth (Hopkin & Rosamond, 2018, 643). It further chimes with the prevailing combative, military-masculine tenor of recent British political debate (Achilleos-Sarll & Martill, 2019; Melhuish, 2022, 2024).

The OBR’s discourse, by contrast, underlines how uncertainty and judgement characterise the economic priesthood. It offers extensive analytical caveats (Clift, 2023a & b) and avoids hypermasculine self-certainty. Its reluctance to intervene in political debate contrasts sharply with machonomics’ enthusiastic combativeness. The OBR exhibits a ‘technocratic’ or ‘gentleman-bureaucrat’ masculinity, still performing masculinised characteristics of rationality and calculation, yet adopting a ‘softer’ discursive register with feminised undertones (Hooper, 2001, 193; Wright 2021, 152-158). EFT exploited these characteristics, invoking imperial nostalgia to decry the hysteria of ‘Project Fear’ and lament the establishment’s inability to simply believe in Britain (Galpin, 2024).

EFT’s hypermasculine machnonomics championed the can-do attitude of history’s buccaneering ‘great men’, particularly imperial explorers who opened up new trading horizons (Morra, 2016). However, imperial legacies also inform the OBR’s softer technocratic masculinity. Colonial administrators were partly chosen for their even ‘character’: a manner of ‘​“self-denial”, diligence, temperance, and self-control’ (Stoler, 2009 cited in Grewal, 2016, 622), instilled through class position and/or privileged education (Hennessy, 1990, 29-31; Wright, 2021, 152-153). Contemporary British civil servants are similarly expected to exhibit the ‘emotional restraint’ (Wright, 2021, 156) of the ‘imperial “gentlemanly elite”’ (Jackson, 2004, 476). They present ‘dispassionate’ arguments with ‘evidence’ and ‘technical language’ which appears scientific, rational and authoritative (Wright, 2021, 155-157). The OBR exhibited the technocratic masculinity of the ‘gentleman-bureaucrat’ when it spoke about the economy in a cautious ‘feminised’ register (Wright, 2021, 158).

**The Office for Budget Responsibility: Expertise as Uncertainty and Health Warnings**

The OBR is a small organisation, founded in 2010 after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to monitor the UK’s public finances and report on the economy’s health. Its charter protects OBR independence, empowers it to evaluate only the government’s formally-stated policies, and stipulates it must do so objectively, transparently and impartially (Clift, 2023a, 2023b) - a statutory role which circumscribes the content and tone of its interventions. The OBR is primarily governed by a three-person Budget Responsibility Committee (BRC) comprising the Chairman, Economy expert and Fiscal expert. During the Brexit debate, the position of Chairman was occupied by Robert Chote, a business journalist by training, while the remaining BRC positions were held variously by Economists Professor Sir Stephen Nickell, Professor Sir Charles Bean, Andy King and Graham Parker (see Appendix 1). While only one (Bean) holds a formal PhD in Economics, all BRC members have previously occupied senior positions at the Treasury, the Bank of England or the International Monetary Fund.

Given these credentials, the OBR’s core professionals exemplify technocratic economic expertise, but also reveal some common exclusions. There has never been diversity of identity in the OBR’s upper echelons (OECD, 2021, 28), replicating gender, race and class-based monocultures common in the UK’s broader civil service and governing institutions (O’Dwyer, 2019, 164–165; OECD, 2021, 28; 61; Sutton Trust and the Social Mobility Commission, 2019). All BRC members studied here are thus white, suit-wearing men. The majority also hold degrees from the Universities of Oxford or Cambridge. Such self-reinforcing diversity gaps lead to implicitly associating economic expertise with an elite, white, male identity (O’Dwyer, 2019, 164–165), as performed in media interviews, press conferences and parliamentary committee evidence sessions (Clift 2023b).

This racialised, gendered and classed identity is the ‘somatic norm’ in British governance as power has been ‘naturalised in…white, male, upper/middle-class bodies’, particularly from the British Empire onwards (Puwar, 2001, 652). Colonisation brutally overrode indigenous understandings of gender with European ideals of manliness associated with patriarchy, morality and rationality (Morgensen, 2015, 38-44). Colonial masculinity produced a new social order in Britain’s overseas territories; racist imaginaries positioning colonisers as the ‘natural’ vectors of enlightened insight, and the colonised as uncivilised and ‘primitive’ (Morgensen, 2015 50). Colonial masculinity ‘came home’ and is now so normal in Britain as to be unremarkable, allowing white, male civil servants to appear as ‘blank’ or ‘empty’ bodies, notionally devoid of race and gender and so able to ‘be everywhere’ (Goldberg, 1997, 83 cited in Puwar, 2001, 657-9). Their ‘omnipresence’ grants them invisibility (Berger, 2013, 104). By contrast, female and non-white bodies are ‘space invaders’ who ‘are informally excluded by way of not being the somatic norm’ (Puwar, 2001, 657).

The somatic white male norm characterising British governance also involves aesthetic markers like clothing and language (Puwar, 2001, 662). The suit, a longstanding symbol of the ‘English gentleman’, was ‘made for the gestures of talking and calculating abstractly’ (Berger, 2013, 41), symbolically manifesting white respectability and gentleman-bureaucrat masculinity. The somatic norm is also expressed through an educated, emotionally restrained mode of communication which ‘lets the facts…speak for themselves’ (Wright, 2021, 158). Adhering to these conventions of speech and dress may enable others to simulate the authority and authenticity of white, male expertise (Puwar, 2001, 664-666). They are aesthetic symbols of the racialised and masculinised ‘power to “describe and run the world”’ (Brown 1992 cited in Grewal, 2016, 605).

Such power is wielded through the substantive tools of technocratic economic governance (Martin, 2022). Ideational path dependencies see the OBR working with mainstream technocratic understandings of the economy, reflecting the intersectional blind spots of economics’ conventions. The OBR’s broadly New Keynesian outlook identifies a (limited) short-term role for macroeconomic policy in stabilising the economy close to full capacity. The OBR, like the Treasury, sees limits to how far activist fiscal policy can boost the supply side, but assumes the economy’s long-term tendency to revert to trend growth. As a fiscal council, they prioritise prudence, keenly attuned to ‘deficit bias’ and national debt concerns (Clift 2023b). The OBR also aligns with majority expert economic opinion in favouring liberalised international markets. They see the EU Single European Market’s (SEM) regulatory infrastructure through this lens. Here, SEM facilitates freer trade, has positive productivity effects and – ultimately – boosts GDP.

Focusing on GDP produces an exclusionary understanding of the economy, founded on a masculinised preference for productive output in formal employment. The Office has only occasionally considered gender *qua* biological sex as a legitimate economic category, and typically only in limited terms, such as tracking women’s labour market participation (OBR, 2015). Likewise, the OBR discusses the household as a unit of accounting, assessed in terms of disposable income, not understood as a site where crucial work takes place. These sparse efforts maintain problematic public/private dichotomies, simply reproducing the economics profession’s dominant gendered frame of the visible and measurable work that counts as ‘the economy’.

Identity also colours *how* OBR analysis is presented. Its discursive style conveys the economic priesthood’s technocratic, gentleman-bureaucrat masculinity. This approach retains masculinised characteristics of rationality and calculation while exhibiting feminised nuances: notably a more transparent approach to the uncertainty and contestable assumptions entailed in all economic forecasting. This ‘hybrid masculinity’ favours softer attributes like ‘intellect’ over hard hypermasculine power, yet remains complicit in maintaining a social order favouring white men (Wright, 2021, 131-132). OBR technocratic masculinity was highlighted during the referendum when it sought to avoid high-profile interventions projecting Brexit’s likely effects. Consistent with its mandate, the OBR confined itself to ‘announced government policy’. Side-stepping the political rancour surrounding the referendum, it noted ‘it is not for us to judge at this stage what the impact of “Brexit” might be on the economy and the public finances’ (OBR, 2016a, 84).

After Leave won and the government began to outline their Brexit process, the OBR displayed technocratic masculinity by being characteristically transparent about *what* they put into their models. Their November 2016 forecasts were based on relatively circumspect ‘broad brush’ assumptions addressing manifold uncertainties about Brexit’s outcomes, and the size of its effects (OBR, 2016b). They continually referred back to these projections, postponing updates in the unfulfilled hope that the government would provide further Brexit specificity. OBR forecasts envisaged a likely 4% of GDP hit to the economy, rising to 6% for a no-deal exit, always underlining the uncertainties surrounding these projections. They conspicuously located their judgements in the middle of a range of credentialled expert assessments (see Figure 1) (OBR, 2018a). Disparities between assumptions about the form Brexit would take, its associated trade costs, and the size and temporality of these effects largely explain forecasters’ varied results (OBR, 2018a, 37; OBR, 2016a, 84; Tetlow & Stojanovic, 2018, 3). Central positioning amongst expert projections allowed the OBR to deflect political criticism, reinforcing their judicious epistemic status, aligned with a broader community of similarly masculinised technocratic bodies (see O’Dwyer 2019). The OBR only seldom made direct Brexit pronouncements, casting grave doubt on Prime Minister May’s hoped-for Brexit dividend (OBR, 2018b, 105), and warning of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit’s high costs (OBR, 2018a, 8–9; OBR, 2019, 10–11; 255–278).

Figure 1. *Comparing expert assessments of Brexit’s likely economic effects on UK GDP*

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(source Tetlow & Stojanovic 2018, 4)

As the OBR understood, forecasting the effects of unprecedented episodes like Brexit means much greater uncertainty, requiring more assumptions to counter it. The judiciousness and plausibility of those assumptions varies, and with it the quality of different models. Figure 1 suggests a clear distinction between comparable assumptions made by most forecasting teams, and the EFT: a clear optimistic outlier (Sampson et al., 2016; Tetlow & Stojanovic, 2018). That said, *all* economic forecasting has to make *some* questionable assumptions (Clift 2023b). Therefore, one should attach the necessary ‘health warnings’ to *any* Brexit forecasts, and remain mindful of their limited reliability, the modesty of their epistemic status.

Adding caveats and health warnings, or failing to do so, is a political phenomenon (Siles-Brügge, 2019). Adopting the economic priest’s technocratic masculinity, OBR Brexit analysis, and its broader economic forecasting, is steeped in such caveats. Discussing one core economic growth indicator post-referendum, the OBR underlined: ‘There is always considerable uncertainty around this judgement, to which uncertainties associated with [Brexit] are likely to add…the precise impact will remain highly uncertain, even in hindsight’ (2017, 38). By appearing ‘careful’ and ‘thought-through’, such technocratic masculinity incorporates feminised attributes (Wright, 2001, 158), contrasting starkly with EFT’s cavalier machonomics.

**Economists for Free Trade: Expertise as Adversarial Combat**

Economists for Free Trade (EFT) was a pro-Brexit pressure group established in 2016, originally called Economists for Brexit (EFB) (Isaby & Elliott, 2017). Several EFT figures (including original co-Chairs Patrick Minford and Gerard Lyons) hold economics PhDs. Many other non-academic EFT economists situate their expertise in the areas of macroeconomic modelling and analysis seemingly pertinent to forecasting Brexit’s effects. However, further scrutinising such credentials reveals EFT members were attached to an explicitly ideological political economic vision and an ecosystem of conservative think tanks and campaign groups (see Appendix 2), many housed in Westminster’s Tufton Street (Melhuish, 2021). Unlike the OBR’s statutory status, EFT was an overtly political organisation less subject to institutional constraints on its interventions’ content and manner.

Most of EFT’s economists belong to a university business school or private business consultancy (see Appendix 2). The majority of reported EFT expertise is better suited to international business and private financial analysis (annuities, pension funds, financial risk and asset management) than to public macroeconomic policy. Several EFT figures, including Minford, Lyons and Roger Bootle, *have* previously held UK public policy roles. Minford advised HMT as one of Chancellor Norman Lamont’s ‘wise men’ (Minford, 2016a). But these roles seemingly reinforced their attachment to a particular, neoliberal political economy (see Appendix 2).

EFT economists espouse a Thatcherite worldview, advancing a hyperglobal vision of the post-Brexit potential of free markets and trade to boost the UK’s GDP and international standing: persistent themes in Conservative Euroscepticism since the 1980s (Baker et al., 2002). This strand of Tory ideology has increasingly absorbed ‘ideological nationalism, racism and democratic populism’ (Baker et al., 2002, 402; Lynch, 1999, 8), laced with empire nostalgia (Melhuish, 2022). EFT harks back to a minimal 19th Century ‘nightwatchman’ state prioritising ‘low taxation, low government spending, deregulation and privatisation’ (Baker et al., 2002, 409–410). The UK is reimagined as a ‘world island’, ‘a deregulated, free market offshore paradise’ (Gamble, 2003, 178) within a libertarian vision of global markets that are scarcely, if at all, rule-bound. By contrast, the EU is conceived in much more intrusive and restrictive regulatory terms, and presented as anathema to GDP growth.

Despite limited macroeconomic expertise, applying standard media balancing norms to Brexit controversies entailed interpreting EFT’s credentials as conferring authentic epistemic status. Their expertise was presented in the media and Parliament as equivalent to the mainstream economic consensus. This is a symptom of broader and deeper limitations of knowledge and representation in media reporting on the economy (see Basu 2018).

Importantly for our analysis, the exclusionary Tory hyperglobal vision mirrors the narrow identities of experts promoting it. Like the OBR, EFT is dominated by the somatic norm of white, suit-wearing men (see Appendix 2). EFT membership approximated the expected masculinised characteristics of the economist, bolstering the group’s epistemic status by simulating authority and authenticity. The symbolic, ‘redemptive’ power of the suit (Gilroy, 2002, 65), worn by EFT members across their public appearances, reinforced this impression. By appearing business-like, suits suggest competence and objectivity, pre-empting accusations that their wearers harbour political agendas (Saini, 2019, 126-7). Though EFT already almost exclusively comprised white men, their suits conferred an additional layer of credibility. While their analysis was flawed, EFT’s representatives ‘looked the part’ of neutral economic experts.

Yet EFT’s favoured discursive style was distinct from OBR technocratic masculinity. EFT deployed a hypermasculine mode of expertise, embracing the adversarial military-masculine tenor of the Brexit debate. They confidently challenged ‘establishment’ thinking, asserting that ‘Brexit will lower the prices of imports’ by ‘abolishing EU tariffs’, bringing down the cost of living as Corn Law abolition once did (EFB, 2016, 1). They also boldly affirmed unsubstantiated claims that EU prices were 20% above their true level, due largely to ‘EU trade barriers’ (EFB, 2016, 14). Such weak reasoning informed EFT’s central optimistic claim that Brexit would eventually boost GDP by around 4% (see Figure 1).

The establishment economics consensus, shared by the OBR, views the dynamics of international trade through the gravity equation, derived from regularities discernible within decades of empirical data. A country’s most efficient trading relations, this indicates, are with larger markets geographically closer to it. This view recognises multiple sources of trade frictions, and appreciates the trade-facilitating role of common agreed rules and standards, for example, in reducing non-tariff barriers. Here, the SEM and mutual recognition are the manifestation of free trade, not its encumbrance, leading to increased trade intensity and positive productivity effects (Sampson et al., 2016, 1). This is why most experts forecast a softer Brexit doing less damage to GDP (see Figure 1). EFT, characterising themselves as anti-protectionist peoples’ champions (EFB, 2016, 3; 11), derided this consensus as a wrong-headed myth of a craven elite in thrall to flawed ideology.

EFT’s combative style exemplified hired gun machonomics. While their changeable tone at times resembled sober rationality and technocratic calculation, this was interspersed with strident assertion. They caricatured and distorted opposing arguments: ‘can anyone seriously believe…that more free trade is bad for an economy? Yet that is what the Treasury purports to believe’ (EFB, 2016, 2). The very fact that Treasury models diverged from EFT Brexit findings was asserted as grounds to discount them: ‘beware! Long-term garbage in, short-term garbage out!’ (EFB, 2016, 2, 9). EFT self-assuredly ridiculed mainstream economists’ ‘modern technical “voodoo”’ and ‘clever sophisticated tricks’. This scathing but vague methodological critique underpinned Minford’s accusation that those questioning EFT methods and findings do so in support of growth-stifling EU ‘protectionism’ (Minford, 2016a, 3). Yet EFT themselves made heroic assumptions with little explanation or justification. They confidently asserted that only Brexit could improve UK productivity, which they claimed was unaffected by trade and foreign investment (EFB, 2016, 8–9).

EFT hypermasculinity scorned the economic mainstream’s feminised caution, excoriating its ‘hysterical’, ‘Project Fear’ approach. Minford’s model predicted a unilateral post-Brexit free trade policy would cause the ‘elimination’ of UK manufacturing, and greatly increase wage inequality (Sampson et al., 2016, 2). Yet Minford deemed this a price worth paying for rediscovering competitive world prices, the springboard to Brexit’s mooted economic growth advantages. With insouciance characteristic of ‘we know best’ machonomics, Minford proclaimed that eliminating UK manufacturing ‘shouldn’t scare us. Britain is good at putting on a suit and selling to other nations’ (Minford, 2016b). This image once more recalled the somatic norm of white business-like men.

**That’s (still) not our GDP!: Problems with default understandings of ‘the economy’**

While economic expert bodies forecasting Brexit effects share some common identity characteristics, their analytical bases, discursive strategies and styles differ markedly. However, they share a more fundamental commonality in their gendered foundational assumptions and understandings of the economy, and indeed Brexit’s impacts. The bigger picture here is about what economic forecasters *do not* put into their models. These omissions and silences represent a form of scandalous economics, highly consequential for women and minorities, and for how the contours of ‘the economy’ are discursively defined.

Feminist Political Economy (FPE) underlines the problems of viewing ‘the economy’ through GDP, a measure so deeply encoded with masculinised conceptions in ways we usually fail to recognise (Benería, 1999; Peterson, 2005; Steans, 1999). GDP’s problematic exclusions constitute ‘asymmetrical relations of power based on gender’ (Bakker, 1994, 1). Feminist critiques disrupt problematic binaries between public and private, exchange and use value, profit and care, wage labour and subsistence, which portray ‘the first part of the binary as masculine and the second as feminine, thereby establishing a hierarchy between them’ (Prügl, 2021, 295). As the dominant measure of ‘productive’ activity, GDP systematically under-values and under-reports work that falls within the feminised second half of these binaries (Hozić & True, 2016, 6; Waring & Steinem 1988). GDP’s exclusion of ‘women’s work’ is thus a ‘strategic silence’ (Bakker, 1994; O’Dwyer, 2022b, 657-8), occluding and devaluing the vital production of daily necessities, care work sustaining family life, and everyday management of household finances, all still disproportionately undertaken by women.

GDP is also harmful in broader political economic senses. The masculinised quest for continual economic expansion which motivates this measure has deleterious environmental impacts (e.g. Copley, 2022; Hickel, 2020; Paterson, 2021). It is bound up in ‘petro-masculinity’, the ecologically disastrous co-constitutive relationship ‘between fossil fuels and white patriarchal orders’, premised on continuous growth (Daggett, 2018, 28-30). ‘Petro-nostalgia’, present in Trump’s calls to ‘Make America Great Again’, also resonates with strands of pro-Brexit discourse intent on reclaiming Britain’s ‘greatness’ – each subtly promising to ‘make men great again’ (Daggett, 2018, 31–32). Such populist nationalist projects hark back to a traditional male breadwinner family lifestyle, enabled by bountiful, carbon-intensive economic growth (Daggett, 2018, 31–32). Here we see some of the wider social impacts of the gendered economic ‘growth delusion’ (Pilling, 2019), and the broader politics of populist nationalism, still frequently overlooked (Gamble, 2021).

An intersectional feminist analysis recalibrates political economy by asking how systems of production, distribution and exchange are gendered and racialised (Gamble, 2021), revealing wider processes of economic governance as forms of domination (Bedford & Rai, 2010). However, the Brexit debate was blind to such analyses, which have yet to permeate the UK’s expert economic institutions. Debates on Brexit’s economic effects occasionally addressed geography, but almost never touched on issues of gender or racial inequality. ‘That’s your bloody GDP not mine’, declared one audience member of a public Brexit debate, criticising the measure’s insensitivity to regional economic inequalities (Rosamond, 2020, 1091). Women and minorities could have convincingly claimed the same. Comprehensive equality impact assessments of Brexit were simply not carried out (Guerrina & Masselot, 2021, 396), producing ‘gender bias by omission’ (O’Dwyer, 2019, 170). Blinkered Brexit assessments constitute further examples of ‘strategic silence’, reflecting asymmetric intersectional power relations (Bakker, 1994, 1).

The Brexit debate was conducted through masculinised discursive registers and exhibited masculinised conceptions of ‘the economy’ with important, often neglected, political economic consequences. The GDP focus was operationalised via a widely-shared ‘trade orthodoxy’, which prioritises ‘open markets and free trade’ as vectors of economic growth, while shunning or assimilating critics and legalizing a trade order ‘detrimental to women’ (Hannah et al., 2022, 1371-2). This approach inhibits a holistic, identity-sensitive view of ‘the economy’, which sees trade as a ‘social activity’ involving people’s everyday lives through their ‘multiple roles as workers, consumers’ and carers (Hannah et al., 2018, 35; Stephenson & Fontana, 2019). Although EFT presented themselves as heterodox challengers to the mainstream OBR, both groups exhibited this exclusionary trade orthodoxy. Trade was presented as ‘something free from gender considerations’, by Brexiteers and technocrats alike (Guerrina & Masselot, 2021, 396).

Similar blind spots characterised meagre post-referendum analysis of Brexit’s effects. In 2019, a UK government Brexit impact assessment provided a brief two-paragraph summary of ‘equalities’ issues: efforts pilloried by Scottish government analysis as ‘generic’ and insufficient. The UK Government failed to undertake ‘a sector-by-sector impact assessment of how Brexit may impact on people with different protected characteristics’ (Hepburn, 2020, 5). In March 2020 Cabinet Office Minister Michael Gove shrugged off these concerns, belatedly acknowledging that the 2010 Equality Act meant that there was a ‘statutory obligation’ to produce such assessments. Gove dismissed these evaluations as simply ‘forecasts’ which, unlike a ‘law of Physics’, could not produce a ‘determinative prediction’ (Gove, 2020).

Despite the dearth of official analysis, there are good reasons to assume that Brexit ‘disproportionately and negatively’ affects women and other ‘marginalised groups’ (Haastrup et al., 2019a, 312). The exclusionary contours of the post-GFC austerity agenda has affinities with the uneven distribution of Brexit’s effects (Haastrup et al., 2019a, 311; see also Hozić & True, 2017). An independent report noted Brexit’s likely negative impact on industries and public services that are disproportionately staffed and consumed by women, and raised concerns about Brexit’s effects on household budgets and employment rights, areas of particular importance for women (Women’s Budget Group, 2018).

Yet the prevailing GDP-centric trade orthodoxy means that gendered and other exclusionary effects of post-Brexit trading arrangements remain neglected across multiple ‘scales’, from micro (household) and meso (state) levels, to the macro level of the ‘hierarchical global state system’ which prizes competitiveness over equality (Hannah et al., 2018, 17–19). Put differently, Brexit’s disproportionate and negative intersectional impact on *inter alia* food prices, public services, social reproduction, labour contracts and collective bargaining (Hannah et al., 2018, 19–24), have not featured in a blinkered debate focused on Brexit effects gauged exclusively in masculinised terms of GDP impacts.

**Conclusion**

Our analytical framework contributes towards addressing significant identity blind spots in political economy and economic sociology when it comes to the study of the social nature of expertise and its politics. The conceptual contribution of this intersectional analysis, nourished by FPE insights, explores afresh the ways capitalist relations of production, distribution and exchange, and the expert discourses interpreting them, are gendered, racialised and classed. Deploying insights from visual politics reveals processes of simulated authenticity, illuminating how identity markers shape perceptions of authority. This analysis exposes ‘strategic silences’ (Bakke 1994), and forms of domination, within processes and discourses of expert economic governance. It has broader relevance for those researching expertise as a social phenomenon across disciplines, suggesting applications to arenas from health to climate change governance. These are also realms where the ‘scientific’ basis of expertise may be co-opted and contested by superficial expert avatars, and where exclusionary identity markers may limit who gets to speak with authority.

Our analyses of two key expert economics organisations in the Brexit debate, the OBR and EFT, explored the central role of a white, masculine identity in constituting what counts as authoritative and authentic expertise and defining how it is discursively conveyed. Each group mobilised a distinctive masculinised discursive style to express diverging worldviews about Brexit’s likely impact on the economy. Disaggregating these gendered and racialised discursive strands revealed multi-faceted exclusionary dimensions of Brexit expertise. Furthermore, we found that both groups shared the same deficient and exclusionary GDP-centric view of ‘the economy’.

Feminist scholarship suggests the Brexit debate could have been conducted differently. Authenticity in expertise or discourse is not immutable, but a fluid and shifting construct (Grainge, 2000). The GDP-based understanding of ‘the economy’ is deeply entrenched across the gendered economic expertise regime (cf. O’Dwyer, 2019), but this system of knowing could be reimagined. It would require a fundamental rethink about the nature of ‘the economy’, and its study (Peterson 2005) - a daunting task, yet one that should be attempted (Collins & Bilge, 2020: Chapter 8). Indeed, environmentalists (e.g. Copley, 2022; Hickel, 2020; Paterson, 2021) similarly call for more holistic, socio-ecological understandings of economic life to end the ecological violence enacted to sustain economic growth. Feminists have likewise already suggested several practical means for transforming economic debates and expertise.

Greater female and minority representation provides a necessary first step in discussions of masculinised ‘technical’ areas like trade (Haastrup et al., 2019b, 65; Hannah et al., 2021). This corrective, however, is insufficient to redress unequal power relations and ensure that marginalised interests are reflected in political economic debates. Women and minorities are not unitary groups with streamlined interests. Women do not always act ‘for’ women, and no one woman can represent the broad category ‘women’. Nevertheless, the lived experiences of descriptive representatives remain important for grounding expertise in everyday realities that are otherwise overlooked (Celis & Childs, 2020). If the white man is considered to be the default, authentic economic expert, can we imagine authentic expertise differently? Might we think of an authentic expert instead as someone substantively and affectively representing their community, drawing on lived experience to credibly make diverse voices feel seen and heard in mainstream debates? (Celis & Childs, 2020). ‘There is no authenticity except that of personal experience’ (Saini 2019, 291) - future research could fruitfully explore these themes.

Beyond representation, proper gender and equality impact assessments of Brexit, and proposed trade agreements, should have been undertaken (see e.g. Hannah et al., 2018, 34–35). One possible method might have used gender-sensitive computational general equilibrium modelling (CGE) (see e.g. Fontana, 2004). This approach, while not without its own methodological issues, combines gendered Social Accountability Matrices with CGE to account for the impact of different trade policies on feminised spheres including households (Hannah et al., 2018, 16). It is more relevant and specific when used with broader methods that depart from the masculinised calculative logics of standard econometric models. Holistic means of data collection and analysis are better equipped to capture the economy’s social dimensions. These include methods such as surveys exploring ‘how forms of economic participation are shaped by existing gender norms and power relations’ (Hannah et al., 2018, 35-36). Other qualitative or hybrid approaches can illuminate different aspects of employment and ‘invisible’ (services) trade, plus the implications of international trade agreements for UK labour and social services mandates. All of these are disproportionately consequential for women and minorities (Hannah et al., 2018, 36–37).

Our identity-based framework endorses such methodological innovations. It has revealed how intersectional exclusionary power dynamics shape how ‘the economy’ is conceptualised. We offer fresh insights for analysing the politics of economic expertise by underlining both the openness and closure around the ‘expert’ category. Engaging with visual politics, we developed the concept of simulated authenticity, which has underlined gendered, racialised and classed markers of expert authority. These insights illuminate the social nature of expertise, and could be fruitfully applied to further domains characterised by competing experts and their avatars, including in the realms of tackling the climate crisis, and health governance.

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**Author Biographies**

Ben Clift is Professor of Political Economy in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick. His work focuses on the politics of economic ideas. His books include *The* *Office for Budget Responsibility and the Politics of Technocratic Economic Governance* (Oxford University Press 2023), *The* *IMF and the Politics of Austerity* (Oxford University Press 2018) and *Comparative Political Economy: States, Markets and Global Capitalism* (Palgrave 2014; 2nd Edition Bloomsbury 2021).

Dr Francesca Melhuish is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Southampton. Her independent research focuses on nostalgia and the politics of emotions. She has also worked collaboratively on a range of political economy, international relations and British politics projects across the universities of Birmingham, Durham, Nottingham and Warwick.

Ben Rosamond is Professor of Politics and International Relations in the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh. His current work focuses on the politics of economic ideas and the political economy of Brexit. His most recent book is the *Routledge Handbook of Critical European* *Studies* (co-edited with Didier Bigo et al, Routledge 2021).

**Appendix 1: Office for Budget Responsibility (Senior Staff, 2010-2021)**[[1]](#footnote-1)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Scholarly credentials**[[2]](#footnote-2) | **Professional Experience** | **Expertise** | **CV link** |
| Charles Bean | BRC member (Jan 2017-Dec 2021). | PhD, MIT (Essays in Unemployment and Economic Activity).  BA MA, Cambridge (Economics and Mathematics).  LSE Professorship (now part-time); misc. visiting professorships. | Bank of England, Executive Director; Deputy Governor, (2000-2014).  HMT, Economic adviser/assistant (1975-1979; 1981-1982). | Macroeconomics; monetary policy; UK economic statistics. | <https://www.lse.ac.uk/economics/Assets/Documents/FacultyCVs/CharlesBeanCV.pdf> |
| Robert Chote | Chairman & BRC member (Oct 2010-Oct 2020). | BA MA, Cambridge (Economics);  PG Dip, City UoL (Journalism);  MA [incomplete?], Johns Hopkins (International Public Policy). | IFS Director (2002-2010).  IMF adviser/speechwriter for First Deputy Managing Director (1999-2002).  Economics and business editor/journalist, FT & Independent (1990-1999). | Managing think tanks and watchdogs (March 2022, appointed to Chair UK Statistics Authority). | <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmtreasy/459/45905.html> |
| Andy King | BRC member (Sept 2018-2023).  Chief of Staff (June 2013-Aug 2018). | BA, Oxford (PPE). | IMF, Fiscal expert (Jun 2014).  HMT, Deputy Director, Economics Group (Aug 2010-June 2013); misc. Economist roles (from Nov 1998).  Also held roles at: ODI; FCO (Japan); Ministry of Finance (Liberia). | Macroeconomic policy; fiscal governance, reporting and forecasting in UK, Africa & Asia. | <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/treasury-committee/appointment-of-andy-king-as-member-of-the-budget-responsibility-committee-obr/written/86593.html> |
| Steve Nickell | BRC member (Apr 2011-Dec 2016). | Honorary doctorate, Warwick.  BA, Cambridge (Mathematics);  MSc, LSE (Mathematical Economics & Econometrics).  Prior Professorships, LSE; Oxford. | Bank of England, external MPC member (2000-06). | Macroeconomic performance; causes of unemployment; productivity. | <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtreasy/545/545we02.htm#a2> |
| Graham Parker | BRC member (Nov 2010-Aug 2018) | Diploma, UCL (Statistics).  PhD; BSc, Bristol (Chemistry). | HMT, Head of Public Sector Finances (Nov 1999-Jan 2009).  Inland Revenue, misc. inc. Assistant Director, (Aug 1986-Nov 1999).  IMF, Fiscal Affairs technical expert (2008-).  Long UK civil service career. | Public sector finances (spending and taxation). | <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtreasy/545/545we03.htm> |

**Appendix 2: Economists for Brexit/Free Trade (Members, 2016-2021)**[[3]](#footnote-3)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Scholarly credentials**[[4]](#footnote-4) | **Professional experience** | **Expertise** | **CV link** |
| Patrick Minford | Member (2017-2021)  Co-chair (2016-2017). | PhD, LSE.  MSc, LSE (Economics).  BA, Oxford (PPE).  Endowed chair, University of Liverpool (1976-1991).  Honorary Doctor of Science (Buckingham) | Professor, Cardiff Business School; Founder Liverpool Research Group; Advisory Council, Tax Payers’ Alliance. | Macroeconomic modeling, monetary economics | <https://www.patrickminford.net/Academic_Page/CURRICULUM_VITAE_MINFORD_February2015.pdf> |
| Gerard Lyons | Co-chair (2016-2017) | PhD, QMUL.  MA, Warwick (Economics).  BA, Liverpool (Maths & Economics). | Chief Economic Advisor to Boris Johnson (Mayor of London); Chief Economist in City banking sector. | Economic forecasting for the financial sector | <https://www.linkedin.com/in/drgerardlyons/details/education/> |
| Vudayagi Balasubramanyam | Member (2017-2021) | PhD, Illinois. | Professor Emeritus, Lancaster University Management School | Development economics, FDI, technology transfer | <https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/lums/people/vudayagi-balasubramanyam> |
| David Blake | Member (2017-2021)  Advisory Group (2016-2017) | PhD, LSE (UK pension fund investment behaviour). | Professor/Director of Pensions Institute, Cass/Bayes Business School, City University; Chairman Square Mile Consultants. | Annuities and pension funds | <https://www.pensions-institute.org/the-director/> |
| Roger Bootle | Member (2016-2021) | BA, Oxford (PPE)  MA, Oxford  Lecturer, Oxford (mid-1970s). | Chair, Capital Economics; HoC Treasury Select Committee specialist advisor; *Daily Telegraph* columnist; author. | Monetary economics | n.d. |
| Ryan Bourne | Member (2016-2017) | BA/MPhil, Cambridge (Economics). | Head of Public Policy at Institute of Economic Affairs; previously Centre for Policy Studies; Frontier Economics | Public understanding of Economics | <https://www.linkedin.com/in/ryan-bourne-94866733/?originalSubdomain=uk> |
| Michael Burrage | Member (2016-2021) | Fullbright Scholar, Pennsylvania (Social Science).  BSc, LSE (Economics, Sociology, Politics).  Research fellowships and lecturing positions at Harvard, Berkeley, LSE. | Telecoms entrepreneur; Senior Research Fellow at Civitas. | Strategic market research | <https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-burrage-ba465a23/?originalSubdomain=uk> |
| Tim Congdon | Member (2016-2021) | BA MA, Oxford (History and Economics).  Honorary Professor Cardiff Business School (1990-2006); Director, Institute of International Monetary Research (Buckingham). | CEO International Monetary Research; Founder Lombard Street Research; Former UKIP leadership candidate; former economic advisor to the Conservative Party (1993-1997); former Honorary Chair Freedom Association; journalist and author; Advisory Council, Tax Payers’ Alliance. | Economic forecasting; monetarism | <https://www.selsdongroup.co.uk/congdon.pdf> |
| Kevin Dowd | Member (2017-2021)  Advisory Group (2016-2017) | PhD, Sheffield (Macroeconomics).  MA, Western Ontario (Economics).  BA, Sheffield (Economics). | Professor, Durham University Business School; Partner, Cobden Partners; Senior Fellow, The Cobden Centre; Advisory Council, Tax Payers’ Alliance. Affiliated with the CATO Institute; Adam Smith Institute; IEA; Pensions Institute. | Financial risk management; macroeconomics; free banking; financial regulation. | <https://www.cobdencentre.org/about/our-team/>  <https://onedrive.live.com/?authkey=%21AGF3LrWMc1p%5FJ%2DI&id=A845116E3A8F68FF%2123753&cid=A845116E3A8F68FF&parId=root&parQt=sharedby&parCid=7E04274E7EFC9135&o=OneUp> |
| John Greenwood | Member (2017-2021) | Honorary PhD Edinburgh.  MA, Edinburgh (Economics & Economic History).  Economic research position at Tokyo University (early 1970s). | Chief Economist, Invesco. | Economic analysis and forecasting; monetary economics. | <https://www.linkedin.com/in/john-greenwood-0a636613/details/education/>  <https://sites.krieger.jhu.edu/iae/files/2017/04/John-Greenwood-CV.pdf> |
| Liam Halligan | Member (2017-2018) | MPhil, Oxford (Economics/Econometrics).  BSc, Warwick (Economics). | Research economist (think tanks; IMF; Warwick); advisor to The Social Market Foundation and Department for International Trade; broadcaster; *Sunday Telegraph* columnist | Policy analysis; (Russian) macroeconomics. | <https://www.ukwhoswho.com/display/10.1093/ww/9780199540884.001.0001/ww-9780199540884-e-151463>  <https://www.linkedin.com/in/liam-halligan-4aa75967/details/education/> |
| Andrea Hossó | Member (2017-2021) | n.d. | Economist, financial professional, ‘former trade negotiator’ | Asset management. | n.d. |
| Martin Howe | Member (2017-2021)  Advisory Group (2016-2017) | BA, Cambridge (Engineering & Law). | Barrister | Intellectual property; EU law | <http://www.martinhowe.co.uk/pubs/legal/mhcv.pdf> |
| Warwick Lightfoot | Member (2016-2021) | BA, Oxford (Jurisprudence). | Head of Economics and Social Policy, Policy Exchange; Former special advisor to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1989-1992) | Monetary economics, labour markets, public finance. | <https://policyexchange.org.uk/blogs/policy-exchange-2016/>  <https://www.exeter.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/exon-16.pdf> |
| Graeme Leach | Member (2017-2021)  Advisory Group (2016-2017) | Claims a visiting professorship (unspecified) | CEO of Macronomics consultancy; former Director of Economics, Legatum Institute; Chief Economist and Director of Policy, Institute of Directors; member of Institute for Economic Affairs shadow monetary policy committee; columnist for *City AM* | Future megatrends; macroeconomics. | <https://www.linkedin.com/in/graeme-leach-15a4b684/?originalSubdomain=uk>  <https://www.graemeleach.com/about/> |
| Neil MacKinnon | Member (2016-2021) | MSc, Southampton (Economics & Econometrics).  BA, Liverpool (Economics). | Global Macro Strategist, VTB Capital; former Treasury Economist | Global macroeconomics; financial markets. | <https://harbour.space/faculty/neil-mackinnon> |
| Kent Matthews | Member (2016-2021) | PhD, Liverpool (Economics).  MSc, Birkbeck (Economics).  BSc, LSE (Economics).  Professorships at Cardiff; Nottingham. | Professor, The University of Nottingham Ningbo China; Professor, Cardiff Business School. | Modelling and forecasting; money and credit; banking deregulation. | <https://www.linkedin.com/in/kent-matthews-5161b085/details/education/> |
| Edgar Miller | Convener (2017-2021) | MBA, Harvard (Business Administration).  Visiting Fellow, Cass Business School. | Venture capitalist; managing director Palladian Limited; funder Global Warming Policy Foundation | Unspecified. | <https://www.linkedin.com/in/edgar-miller-24908110/> |
| David Paton | Member (2017-2021) | PhD, UCL.  MA, Warwick.  BSc, London. | Professor, Nottingham University Business School | Economics of cricket; Teenage pregnancy; gambling taxation; post-Brexit economy. | <https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/people/lizdp.phtml> |
| John Whittaker | Member (2017-2021) | PhD, Cape Town (Nuclear Physics).  BA, Cape Town (Economics).  BSc, QMUL (Physics). | Former UKIP MEP; Senior Teaching Fellow, Lancaster University Management School. | Monetary policy, money and banking, macroeconomics. | <https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/lums/people/john-whittaker2> |

Figure Caption

Figure 1. *Comparing expert assessments of Brexit’s likely economic effects on UK GDP*

1. The list of relevant OBR personnel is drawn from <https://obr.uk/> (accessed 3rd May 2022) and Clift (2023b). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The list is drawn from <https://web.archive.org/web/20160501190011/http://www.economistsforbrexit.co.uk/about-us> and <https://web.archive.org/web/20170821065147/http://www.economistsforfreetrade.com:80/who-we-are/> (accessed 27th November 2023) and Rosamond (2020) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)