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“Please let me know whether it seems to you absurd or ridiculous to bring in necessity and contingency”. Dorothy Wrinch and Bertrand Russell on the role of logic in our knowledge of the external world

“Please let me know whether it seems to you absurd or ridiculous to bring in necessity and contingency”. Dorothy Wrinch and Bertrand Russell on the role of logic in our knowledge of the external world
“Please let me know whether it seems to you absurd or ridiculous to bring in necessity and contingency”. Dorothy Wrinch and Bertrand Russell on the role of logic in our knowledge of the external world
In this paper, we will discuss Wrinch’s reflections on logic at the intersection among logic, epistemology and metaphysics. We will see, first, how Wrinch was a Russellian philosopher and scientist, as she explicitly believed in Russell’s logical-analytic method and in the “all-important” role Russell saw for logic in our knowledge of the external world. Second, we will see how Wrinch’s reflections also show us that, in 1918, one could endorse the Russellian overarching project as presented in Our Knowledge of the External World while holding that logic can provide us with kinds of pieces of knowledge of the external world that go beyond those Russell was happy to admit.
2159-0303
Felappi, Giulia
9c0bc4c5-5547-434e-8bbd-0c785bece1bc
Felappi, Giulia
9c0bc4c5-5547-434e-8bbd-0c785bece1bc

Felappi, Giulia (2025) “Please let me know whether it seems to you absurd or ridiculous to bring in necessity and contingency”. Dorothy Wrinch and Bertrand Russell on the role of logic in our knowledge of the external world. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy. (In Press)

Record type: Article

Abstract

In this paper, we will discuss Wrinch’s reflections on logic at the intersection among logic, epistemology and metaphysics. We will see, first, how Wrinch was a Russellian philosopher and scientist, as she explicitly believed in Russell’s logical-analytic method and in the “all-important” role Russell saw for logic in our knowledge of the external world. Second, we will see how Wrinch’s reflections also show us that, in 1918, one could endorse the Russellian overarching project as presented in Our Knowledge of the External World while holding that logic can provide us with kinds of pieces of knowledge of the external world that go beyond those Russell was happy to admit.

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Please let me know. Wrinch and Russell on logic
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Accepted/In Press date: 9 January 2025

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 498068
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/498068
ISSN: 2159-0303
PURE UUID: 86d5919c-8c71-4186-b12d-96a5d526cf75
ORCID for Giulia Felappi: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-0110-6371

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Date deposited: 07 Feb 2025 17:32
Last modified: 22 Aug 2025 02:14

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