'Doubt gradually loses its sense' or why Wittgenstein is not a fallibilist

Schönbaumsfeld, Genia (2025) 'Doubt gradually loses its sense' or why Wittgenstein is not a fallibilist. In, Hyman, John and Thorne, Michael (eds.) Scepticism and Naturalism: Hume, Wittgenstein, Strawson. Brill. (In Press)

Abstract

The distinction between what is as it were ‘up for grabs’ – what is an object of legitimate enquiry – and what is part of the ‘scaffolding’ that makes such enquiries possible in the first place is a central one that Wittgenstein uses different metaphors to describe. He sometimes characterizes the scaffolding as ‘our picture of the world’ (OC §94), as ‘the rules of a game’ (OC §95), as ‘hardened channels’ for fluid propositions (OC §96), as a river-bed (OC §97), and, perhaps most famously, as ‘hinges’ (OC §342). Taking its cue from these passages, a new way of responding to scepticism has emerged in recent years that has come to be known as ‘hinge epistemology’. Although proponents of it offer very different anti-sceptical strategies and propose diverse readings of the nature of ‘hinge propositions’, they nevertheless share the core Wittgensteinian insight that there is a difference in kind between the ‘bedrock’ that stands fast and those ordinary, empirical propositions that can be investigated precisely because this scaffolding is in place. In this paper, I shall provide an account of what this distinction amounts to and respond to some objections that have been raised against it. This will enable us to dispel the misconception that Wittgenstein is a fallibilist about knowledge, and to understand how the difference between the ‘river-bed’ (the ‘scaffolding’) and the ‘movement of the waters’ upon it (OC §97) contributes to showing that doubt gradually loses its sense and that we can – in perfectly good epistemic faith – not accede to the sceptic’s game.

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