Scepticism in the Tractatus and in On Certainty
Scepticism in the Tractatus and in On Certainty
Contrary to Moore, Wittgenstein does not believe that a ‘theoretical’ sceptical doubt can be ‘refuted’ – i.e., proven to be false, as it also cannot be proven to be true. Interestingly, this is an idea that Wittgenstein never really changed his mind about, as already in the Tractatus we find him say: ‘Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked.’ In this contribution, I will explain why Wittgenstein thinks that scepticism is ‘obviously nonsensical’ and what light this can throw on the anti-sceptical strategy that Wittgenstein develops later in On Certainty. I conclude by comparing my proposal to two others in the literature (Moyal-Sharrock’s and Williams’).
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8
Ramharter-Heinrich, Esther
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8
Ramharter-Heinrich, Esther
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
(2025)
Scepticism in the Tractatus and in On Certainty.
In,
Ramharter-Heinrich, Esther, Pichler, Alois and Stadler, Friedrich
(eds.)
100 Years of <i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i> - 70 Years after Wittgenstein’s Death.
(Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society – New Series, 30)
De Gruyter.
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Abstract
Contrary to Moore, Wittgenstein does not believe that a ‘theoretical’ sceptical doubt can be ‘refuted’ – i.e., proven to be false, as it also cannot be proven to be true. Interestingly, this is an idea that Wittgenstein never really changed his mind about, as already in the Tractatus we find him say: ‘Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked.’ In this contribution, I will explain why Wittgenstein thinks that scepticism is ‘obviously nonsensical’ and what light this can throw on the anti-sceptical strategy that Wittgenstein develops later in On Certainty. I conclude by comparing my proposal to two others in the literature (Moyal-Sharrock’s and Williams’).
Text
Scepticism in the Tractatus and On Certainty
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Submitted date: 18 April 2024
Accepted/In Press date: 2025
e-pub ahead of print date: 21 April 2025
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 498837
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/498837
ISSN: 2191-8449
PURE UUID: 2c694b79-f116-41d0-a705-9aaf066a471f
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Date deposited: 03 Mar 2025 18:13
Last modified: 23 Apr 2025 04:01
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Contributors
Editor:
Esther Ramharter-Heinrich
Editor:
Alois Pichler
Editor:
Friedrich Stadler
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