Impact of banker-directors on corporate governance
Impact of banker-directors on corporate governance
The 2008 global financial crisis served as a stark revelation of deep-rooted flaws in corporate governance, especially within financial institutions. These governance failures not only amplified the risks but also triggered a chain reaction of economic instability, shaking the foundations of global markets and eroding trust in the financial system. The crisis underscored the urgent need for reforms to address the systemic vulnerabilities that had long gone unchecked. In response, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) of 2010 was introduced to strengthen corporate governance and enhance risk management in U.S. financial institutions, primarily through the creation of risk committees. This thesis explores the broader impact of the banker-directors on corporate governance, focusing on three critical areas: director quality after the DFA, research and development (R&D) investment decisions, and Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance. The study uses quasi-natural experiments and difference-in-differences methodologies to analyse how banker-directors, those who serve on the boards of both financial and non-financial firms, influence these areas. The findings reveal that, despite the DFA’s aim to enhance corporate governance and promote the appointment of high-quality directors, the Act has had limited impact on the overall improvement of director quality. Moreover, the involvement of banker-directors tends to foster conservative decision-making, particularly in relation to R&D investments where risk aversion hampers innovation. However, during periods of regulatory enforcement, non-financial firms tend to make more substantial ESG-related improvements when banker-directors are preoccupied with their main bank enforcement actions. The results indicate the need for balanced governance structures that consider both financial discipline and long-term strategic goals like innovation and sustainability. This thesis contributes to the literature by shedding light on the nuanced role of banker-directors and the broader consequences of regulatory reforms on corporate behaviour.
Dodd-Frank Act, Director Quality, Risk management, Bank Holding Companies, Risk committee, Board of directors, Bank risk-taking, Director interlocks; Banker-directors; R&D investment; Enforcement Actions; Spillover effect, Director interlocks; Banker-directors; ESG; Environmental, Social, Governance Scores; Corporate Social Responsibility; Enforcement Actions; Spillover effect
University of Southampton
Altunisik, Abdurrahim
83f354c0-12da-49b9-b8aa-fbda3f1e795c
March 2025
Altunisik, Abdurrahim
83f354c0-12da-49b9-b8aa-fbda3f1e795c
Choudhry, Taufiq
6fc3ceb8-8103-4017-b3b5-2d38efa57728
Zhou, Yue
1f8cb3b9-0e34-4dd9-862c-e1c7e238d4c7
Altunisik, Abdurrahim
(2025)
Impact of banker-directors on corporate governance.
University of Southampton, Doctoral Thesis, 221pp.
Record type:
Thesis
(Doctoral)
Abstract
The 2008 global financial crisis served as a stark revelation of deep-rooted flaws in corporate governance, especially within financial institutions. These governance failures not only amplified the risks but also triggered a chain reaction of economic instability, shaking the foundations of global markets and eroding trust in the financial system. The crisis underscored the urgent need for reforms to address the systemic vulnerabilities that had long gone unchecked. In response, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) of 2010 was introduced to strengthen corporate governance and enhance risk management in U.S. financial institutions, primarily through the creation of risk committees. This thesis explores the broader impact of the banker-directors on corporate governance, focusing on three critical areas: director quality after the DFA, research and development (R&D) investment decisions, and Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance. The study uses quasi-natural experiments and difference-in-differences methodologies to analyse how banker-directors, those who serve on the boards of both financial and non-financial firms, influence these areas. The findings reveal that, despite the DFA’s aim to enhance corporate governance and promote the appointment of high-quality directors, the Act has had limited impact on the overall improvement of director quality. Moreover, the involvement of banker-directors tends to foster conservative decision-making, particularly in relation to R&D investments where risk aversion hampers innovation. However, during periods of regulatory enforcement, non-financial firms tend to make more substantial ESG-related improvements when banker-directors are preoccupied with their main bank enforcement actions. The results indicate the need for balanced governance structures that consider both financial discipline and long-term strategic goals like innovation and sustainability. This thesis contributes to the literature by shedding light on the nuanced role of banker-directors and the broader consequences of regulatory reforms on corporate behaviour.
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Published date: March 2025
Keywords:
Dodd-Frank Act, Director Quality, Risk management, Bank Holding Companies, Risk committee, Board of directors, Bank risk-taking, Director interlocks; Banker-directors; R&D investment; Enforcement Actions; Spillover effect, Director interlocks; Banker-directors; ESG; Environmental, Social, Governance Scores; Corporate Social Responsibility; Enforcement Actions; Spillover effect
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Local EPrints ID: 499152
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/499152
PURE UUID: a61c4ed1-e4f1-4423-801b-65ce9f72ce5a
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Date deposited: 11 Mar 2025 17:32
Last modified: 03 Jul 2025 02:26
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Author:
Abdurrahim Altunisik
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