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Vice, skill, and the non-ideal

Vice, skill, and the non-ideal
Vice, skill, and the non-ideal
A central aim of non-epistemology is to eschew idealisations that tend to distort our epistemological theorising. In this paper, I use the resources of non-ideal epistemology to shed light on a perceived asymmetry between the structure of epistemic virtues and vices. On the one hand, epistemic virtues are widely held to exhibit a skill-component as part of their formal structure. On the other hand, epistemic vices are taken to lack this component. I cast doubt on this asymmetry by demonstrating that it is sustained by two idealisations virtue epistemologists have tended to employ in their theorising of epistemic vice and the environments in which agents develop epistemic virtues. In doing so, I argue that this asymmetry has problematically obscured from view what I call ‘vice-indexed skills’ – distinctive skills associated with epistemic vices. The existence of these skills not only reveals an important structural symmetry between the epistemic virtues and vices, but it is something that comes to light by applying the tools of non-ideal epistemology to vice epistemology.
Non-ideal, epistemic vices, skills, vice epistemology, virtue epistemology
0967-2559
Matthews, Taylor
fe7b28dd-5d3d-4cb5-a464-66c5a1e83e6d
Matthews, Taylor
fe7b28dd-5d3d-4cb5-a464-66c5a1e83e6d

Matthews, Taylor (2025) Vice, skill, and the non-ideal. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. (doi:10.1080/09672559.2025.2482919).

Record type: Article

Abstract

A central aim of non-epistemology is to eschew idealisations that tend to distort our epistemological theorising. In this paper, I use the resources of non-ideal epistemology to shed light on a perceived asymmetry between the structure of epistemic virtues and vices. On the one hand, epistemic virtues are widely held to exhibit a skill-component as part of their formal structure. On the other hand, epistemic vices are taken to lack this component. I cast doubt on this asymmetry by demonstrating that it is sustained by two idealisations virtue epistemologists have tended to employ in their theorising of epistemic vice and the environments in which agents develop epistemic virtues. In doing so, I argue that this asymmetry has problematically obscured from view what I call ‘vice-indexed skills’ – distinctive skills associated with epistemic vices. The existence of these skills not only reveals an important structural symmetry between the epistemic virtues and vices, but it is something that comes to light by applying the tools of non-ideal epistemology to vice epistemology.

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Accepted/In Press date: 14 March 2025
e-pub ahead of print date: 6 April 2025
Published date: 6 April 2025
Keywords: Non-ideal, epistemic vices, skills, vice epistemology, virtue epistemology

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 500286
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/500286
ISSN: 0967-2559
PURE UUID: 5cbeb805-1b1a-429b-a55d-6e095110e312

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Date deposited: 23 Apr 2025 16:53
Last modified: 21 Aug 2025 04:07

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Author: Taylor Matthews

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