Resource task games
Resource task games
In this work, we introduce Resource Task Games (RTGs), a model of cooperative strategic interactions generalising Wooldridge and Dunne’s Coalitional Resource Games. In RTGs, agents are endowed with different types of resources, which can be put towards graded completion of certain tasks. Agents have preferences over the states of completion of these tasks and can allocate resources in cooperation with other agents. We introduce a notion of core for RTGs and investigate the existence and computation of stable outcomes and core-related closure properties. We show that RTGs are sufficiently expressive to encode Transferable Utility (TU) games efficiently,providing a construction from an arbitrary TU game to an RTG that preserves the core. We provide the computational complexity classes of problems relating to the core of these games, including bounds on the polynomial hierarchy for each problem.
Resources, Transferable Utility Games, Coalitions, Core, Multiagent systems, Computational complexity, Coalitional games
Newman, Jessica L.
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Gerding, Enrico
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Marchioni, Enrico
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Rastegari, Bahar
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May 2025
Newman, Jessica L.
a59b52b3-72ff-4c38-ade1-fe23988234a6
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Marchioni, Enrico
729c9984-5949-438e-8de7-0e079bdb9f96
Rastegari, Bahar
6ba9e93c-53ba-4090-8f77-c1cb1568d7d1
Newman, Jessica L., Gerding, Enrico, Marchioni, Enrico and Rastegari, Bahar
(2025)
Resource task games.
AAMAS - 2025 : The 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, , Detroit, United States.
19 - 23 May 2025.
9 pp
.
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
In this work, we introduce Resource Task Games (RTGs), a model of cooperative strategic interactions generalising Wooldridge and Dunne’s Coalitional Resource Games. In RTGs, agents are endowed with different types of resources, which can be put towards graded completion of certain tasks. Agents have preferences over the states of completion of these tasks and can allocate resources in cooperation with other agents. We introduce a notion of core for RTGs and investigate the existence and computation of stable outcomes and core-related closure properties. We show that RTGs are sufficiently expressive to encode Transferable Utility (TU) games efficiently,providing a construction from an arbitrary TU game to an RTG that preserves the core. We provide the computational complexity classes of problems relating to the core of these games, including bounds on the polynomial hierarchy for each problem.
Text
AAMAS_2025_Resource_Task_Games
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 19 December 2024
Published date: May 2025
Venue - Dates:
AAMAS - 2025 : The 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, , Detroit, United States, 2025-05-19 - 2025-05-23
Keywords:
Resources, Transferable Utility Games, Coalitions, Core, Multiagent systems, Computational complexity, Coalitional games
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 500609
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/500609
PURE UUID: 72bc5b3a-8d11-4017-957c-60a7fc16b1a6
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 07 May 2025 16:35
Last modified: 25 May 2025 05:11
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Contributors
Author:
Jessica L. Newman
Author:
Enrico Gerding
Author:
Enrico Marchioni
Author:
Bahar Rastegari
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