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SonarSnoop: active acoustic side-channel attacks

SonarSnoop: active acoustic side-channel attacks
SonarSnoop: active acoustic side-channel attacks
We report the first active acoustic side-channel attack. Speakers are used to emit human inaudible acoustic signals and the echo is recorded via microphones, turning the acoustic system of a smart phone into a sonar system. The echo signal can be used to profile user interaction with the device. For example, a victim's finger movements can be inferred to steal Android phone unlock patterns. In our empirical study, the number of candidate unlock patterns that an attacker must try to authenticate herself to a Samsung S4 Android phone can be reduced by up to 70% using this novel acoustic side-channel. Our approach can be easily applied to other application scenarios and device types. Overall, our work highlights a new family of security threats.
cs.CR
Cheng, Peng
1e49aef0-36ef-4cda-af2a-9753881419c9
Bagci, Ibrahim Ethem
e1bbc020-49d6-4201-b40b-b80a049b4c11
Roedig, Utz
77ec02bf-0a48-4960-b02a-892f27501e6d
Yan, Jeff
a2c03187-3722-46c8-b73b-439eb9d1a10e
Cheng, Peng
1e49aef0-36ef-4cda-af2a-9753881419c9
Bagci, Ibrahim Ethem
e1bbc020-49d6-4201-b40b-b80a049b4c11
Roedig, Utz
77ec02bf-0a48-4960-b02a-892f27501e6d
Yan, Jeff
a2c03187-3722-46c8-b73b-439eb9d1a10e

[Unknown type: UNSPECIFIED]

Record type: UNSPECIFIED

Abstract

We report the first active acoustic side-channel attack. Speakers are used to emit human inaudible acoustic signals and the echo is recorded via microphones, turning the acoustic system of a smart phone into a sonar system. The echo signal can be used to profile user interaction with the device. For example, a victim's finger movements can be inferred to steal Android phone unlock patterns. In our empirical study, the number of candidate unlock patterns that an attacker must try to authenticate herself to a Samsung S4 Android phone can be reduced by up to 70% using this novel acoustic side-channel. Our approach can be easily applied to other application scenarios and device types. Overall, our work highlights a new family of security threats.

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1808.10250v1
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More information

Published date: 30 August 2018
Keywords: cs.CR

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 500794
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/500794
PURE UUID: 87953973-bec6-4a7e-97b8-a771ba03a1b0

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Date deposited: 13 May 2025 16:50
Last modified: 21 Aug 2025 04:42

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Contributors

Author: Peng Cheng
Author: Ibrahim Ethem Bagci
Author: Utz Roedig
Author: Jeff Yan

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