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Security implications of password discretization for click-based graphical passwords

Security implications of password discretization for click-based graphical passwords
Security implications of password discretization for click-based graphical passwords

Discretization is a standard technique used in click-based graphical passwords for tolerating input variance so that approximately correct passwords are accepted by the system. In this paper, we show for the first time that two representative discretization schemes leak a significant amount of password information, undermining the security of such graphical passwords. We exploit such information leakage for successful dictionary attacks on Persuasive Cued Click Points (PCCP), which is to date the most secure click-based graphical password scheme and was considered to be resistant to such attacks. In our experiments, our purely automated attack successfully guessed 69.2% of the passwords when Centered Discretization was used to implement PCCP, and 39.4% of the passwords when Robust Discretization was used. Each attack dictionary we used was of approximately 235 entries, whereas the full password space was of 243 entries. For Centered Discretization, our attack still successfully guessed 50% of the passwords when the dictionary size was reduced to approximately 230 entries. Our attack is also applicable to common implementations of other click-based graphical password systems such as PassPoints and Cued Click Points - both have been extensively studied in the research communities. Copyright is held by the International World Wide Web Conference Committee (IW3C2).

Authentication, Dictionary attack, Discretization, Graphical passwords
1581-1591
Association for Computing Machinery
Zhu, Bin B.
ac66f851-8282-4ebf-918e-284693cc1d4f
Wei, Dongchen
cb37afcc-e4c2-4a1a-8bae-ed79e8845e62
Yang, Maowei
ee8d852b-f889-4077-b74b-3045a40b3a8f
Yan, Jeff
a2c03187-3722-46c8-b73b-439eb9d1a10e
Zhu, Bin B.
ac66f851-8282-4ebf-918e-284693cc1d4f
Wei, Dongchen
cb37afcc-e4c2-4a1a-8bae-ed79e8845e62
Yang, Maowei
ee8d852b-f889-4077-b74b-3045a40b3a8f
Yan, Jeff
a2c03187-3722-46c8-b73b-439eb9d1a10e

Zhu, Bin B., Wei, Dongchen, Yang, Maowei and Yan, Jeff (2013) Security implications of password discretization for click-based graphical passwords. In WWW 2013 - Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on World Wide Web. Association for Computing Machinery. pp. 1581-1591 . (doi:10.1145/2488388.2488526).

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

Discretization is a standard technique used in click-based graphical passwords for tolerating input variance so that approximately correct passwords are accepted by the system. In this paper, we show for the first time that two representative discretization schemes leak a significant amount of password information, undermining the security of such graphical passwords. We exploit such information leakage for successful dictionary attacks on Persuasive Cued Click Points (PCCP), which is to date the most secure click-based graphical password scheme and was considered to be resistant to such attacks. In our experiments, our purely automated attack successfully guessed 69.2% of the passwords when Centered Discretization was used to implement PCCP, and 39.4% of the passwords when Robust Discretization was used. Each attack dictionary we used was of approximately 235 entries, whereas the full password space was of 243 entries. For Centered Discretization, our attack still successfully guessed 50% of the passwords when the dictionary size was reduced to approximately 230 entries. Our attack is also applicable to common implementations of other click-based graphical password systems such as PassPoints and Cued Click Points - both have been extensively studied in the research communities. Copyright is held by the International World Wide Web Conference Committee (IW3C2).

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More information

Published date: 2013
Venue - Dates: 22nd International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW 2013, , Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2013-05-13 - 2013-05-17
Keywords: Authentication, Dictionary attack, Discretization, Graphical passwords

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 500836
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/500836
PURE UUID: dc4e7158-9eb7-4bc9-86e6-c985f88a7f6f

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 13 May 2025 17:24
Last modified: 13 May 2025 17:24

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Contributors

Author: Bin B. Zhu
Author: Dongchen Wei
Author: Maowei Yang
Author: Jeff Yan

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