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Machiavelli as a poker mate - a naturalistic behavioural study on strategic deception

Machiavelli as a poker mate - a naturalistic behavioural study on strategic deception
Machiavelli as a poker mate - a naturalistic behavioural study on strategic deception

Machiavellianism has been considered in the literature as the symbol for manipulative strategies in social conduct. However, it has been rarely studied via behavioural experiments outside the laboratory, in more naturalistic settings. We report the first behavioural study (N = 490) evaluating whether Machiavellian individuals, high Machs, deceive more than low Machs in online poker, where deception is ethically acceptable and strategically beneficial. Specifically, we evaluated Machiavellianism, bluffing patterns, and emotional sensitivity to getting "slow-played" ("stepping into a trap"). Bluffing was assessed by realistic poker tasks wherein participants made decisions to bluff or not, and sensitivity to slow-play by a self-report measure. We found that high Machs had higher average bluffsizes than low Machs (but not higher bluffing frequency) and were more distraught by getting slow-played. The Machiavellian sub-trait "desire for control" also positively predicted bluffing frequency. We show that online poker can be utilized to investigate the psychology of deception and Machiavellianism. The results also illustrate a conceptual link between unethical and ethical types of deception, as Machiavellianism is implicated in both.

Bluffing, Deception, Machiavellianism, Poker
0191-8869
266-271
Palomäki, Jussi
255358f0-7a18-4d5d-8fc5-e13f4cf62b30
Yan, Jeff
a2c03187-3722-46c8-b73b-439eb9d1a10e
Laakasuo, Michael
021a2d5b-1914-44e4-89c6-9466cc064256
Palomäki, Jussi
255358f0-7a18-4d5d-8fc5-e13f4cf62b30
Yan, Jeff
a2c03187-3722-46c8-b73b-439eb9d1a10e
Laakasuo, Michael
021a2d5b-1914-44e4-89c6-9466cc064256

Palomäki, Jussi, Yan, Jeff and Laakasuo, Michael (2016) Machiavelli as a poker mate - a naturalistic behavioural study on strategic deception. Personality and Individual Differences, 98, 266-271. (doi:10.1016/j.paid.2016.03.089).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Machiavellianism has been considered in the literature as the symbol for manipulative strategies in social conduct. However, it has been rarely studied via behavioural experiments outside the laboratory, in more naturalistic settings. We report the first behavioural study (N = 490) evaluating whether Machiavellian individuals, high Machs, deceive more than low Machs in online poker, where deception is ethically acceptable and strategically beneficial. Specifically, we evaluated Machiavellianism, bluffing patterns, and emotional sensitivity to getting "slow-played" ("stepping into a trap"). Bluffing was assessed by realistic poker tasks wherein participants made decisions to bluff or not, and sensitivity to slow-play by a self-report measure. We found that high Machs had higher average bluffsizes than low Machs (but not higher bluffing frequency) and were more distraught by getting slow-played. The Machiavellian sub-trait "desire for control" also positively predicted bluffing frequency. We show that online poker can be utilized to investigate the psychology of deception and Machiavellianism. The results also illustrate a conceptual link between unethical and ethical types of deception, as Machiavellianism is implicated in both.

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More information

Published date: 1 August 2016
Additional Information: Publisher Copyright: © 2016 Elsevier Ltd.
Keywords: Bluffing, Deception, Machiavellianism, Poker

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 500864
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/500864
ISSN: 0191-8869
PURE UUID: b12c7f12-1593-4bed-9775-93d2ed21f63b

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Date deposited: 14 May 2025 16:51
Last modified: 14 May 2025 16:51

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Contributors

Author: Jussi Palomäki
Author: Jeff Yan
Author: Michael Laakasuo

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