A rigorous analysis of the safety and security in cyber-physical systems

Abstract

The conflict among dependability properties, such as safety and security in
cyber-physical systems, requires a co-analysis of both aspects to ensure the dependability of such systems. Therefore, it is important to employ integrated methodologies for analysing safety and security to mitigate design flaws. Traditional safety analysis approaches, focusing on component failures and simple cause-and-effect chains, cannot find unsafe events caused by
complex system interconnections. On the other hand, Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) considers losses to be the result of interactions but does not leverage threat models to find potential security and their effects on system safety. In this work, our approach integrates
both systematic analysis (STPA and STRIDE) and formal methods (Event-B) to address both safety and security concerns and apply suitable design constraints. Also, implementing Event-B formalism helps us to rigorously specify the safety and security constraints and verify the system's behaviour. We apply our approach to an emergency vehicular system to demonstrate itseffectiveness.

More information

Identifiers

ORCID for Samih Alkhamissi: orcid.org/0000-0002-6875-8999

ORCID for Reza Rezazadeh: orcid.org/0000-0002-0029-469X

ORCID for Asieh Salehi Fathabadi: orcid.org/0000-0002-0508-3066

Catalogue record

Export record