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Focal points, beliefs, and distributional preferences: an experimental analysis

Focal points, beliefs, and distributional preferences: an experimental analysis
Focal points, beliefs, and distributional preferences: an experimental analysis
This paper experimentally examines the interplay between focal points, beliefs, and distributional preferences. Contrary to common wisdom, there is no detectable evidence that equal splits act as salient focal points in distributional voting contexts. Participants mispredict others’ preferences: they overestimate egalitarianism when Pareto efficient options are available and underestimate it when efficiency gains come at others’ expense. There is a clear correlation between individuals’ preferences and beliefs (false-consensus bias), and participants are more egalitarian when they perceive a low probability of being pivotal (cheap fairman talk). These findings challenge assumptions about focal points and highlight belief-driven behavior in distributional settings.
Distributional preferences, Focal Points, Equal split, Belief elicitation, False-consensus bias
1287
The University of Osaka
Ferreira, João V.
0aad606a-eab0-473c-a230-9b3dfa2d7d93
Hanaki, Nobuyuki
33ae7fa6-d05c-41a1-94f8-36a95a68cdd4
Tarroux, Benoît
3f76c7cb-5292-456f-b29c-cfbe3a43e77c
Ferreira, João V.
0aad606a-eab0-473c-a230-9b3dfa2d7d93
Hanaki, Nobuyuki
33ae7fa6-d05c-41a1-94f8-36a95a68cdd4
Tarroux, Benoît
3f76c7cb-5292-456f-b29c-cfbe3a43e77c

Ferreira, João V., Hanaki, Nobuyuki and Tarroux, Benoît (2025) Focal points, beliefs, and distributional preferences: an experimental analysis (The Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper, 1287) The University of Osaka 69pp.

Record type: Monograph (Working Paper)

Abstract

This paper experimentally examines the interplay between focal points, beliefs, and distributional preferences. Contrary to common wisdom, there is no detectable evidence that equal splits act as salient focal points in distributional voting contexts. Participants mispredict others’ preferences: they overestimate egalitarianism when Pareto efficient options are available and underestimate it when efficiency gains come at others’ expense. There is a clear correlation between individuals’ preferences and beliefs (false-consensus bias), and participants are more egalitarian when they perceive a low probability of being pivotal (cheap fairman talk). These findings challenge assumptions about focal points and highlight belief-driven behavior in distributional settings.

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More information

Published date: May 2025
Keywords: Distributional preferences, Focal Points, Equal split, Belief elicitation, False-consensus bias

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 502883
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/502883
PURE UUID: 2895eb69-cb4b-4214-a5b6-2f503ba15c10
ORCID for João V. Ferreira: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6393-8667

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 10 Jul 2025 17:24
Last modified: 11 Jul 2025 02:06

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Contributors

Author: Nobuyuki Hanaki
Author: Benoît Tarroux

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