Efficient tournaments within teams
Efficient tournaments within teams
We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is a partial and noisy ranking which specifies who comes first in efforts among the competing partners. This enables us to ensure both first-best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output only among partners. Our efficiency result is obtained for a wide range of cost and production functions.
103-119
Gershkov, Alex
214a0b5e-c742-486d-b910-c8ec702c943a
Li, Jianpei
42aa7843-130f-430e-b354-c4b0608a93ac
Schweinzer, Paul
003ec8c8-a450-490e-a975-ba67fc0736a4
2009
Gershkov, Alex
214a0b5e-c742-486d-b910-c8ec702c943a
Li, Jianpei
42aa7843-130f-430e-b354-c4b0608a93ac
Schweinzer, Paul
003ec8c8-a450-490e-a975-ba67fc0736a4
Gershkov, Alex, Li, Jianpei and Schweinzer, Paul
(2009)
Efficient tournaments within teams.
RAND Journal of Economics, 40 (1), .
Abstract
We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is a partial and noisy ranking which specifies who comes first in efforts among the competing partners. This enables us to ensure both first-best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output only among partners. Our efficiency result is obtained for a wide range of cost and production functions.
This record has no associated files available for download.
More information
Published date: 2009
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 503667
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/503667
ISSN: 0741-6261
PURE UUID: 972e8428-a71e-4bec-99cf-f86f93fef29b
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 08 Aug 2025 16:37
Last modified: 09 Aug 2025 02:19
Export record
Contributors
Author:
Alex Gershkov
Author:
Jianpei Li
Author:
Paul Schweinzer
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics