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How to share it out: the value of information in teams

How to share it out: the value of information in teams
How to share it out: the value of information in teams
We study the role of information exchange, leadership, and coordination in team and partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes—a “team”—as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once each team member decides on whether or not to share his private information truthfully, he chooses which effort to exert in the joint production process. This effort, however, is not contractible: only the realized output (or profit) of the team can be observed. Our central question is whether or not incentives can be provided to a team in this environment such that team members communicate their private information and exert efficient productive efforts on the basis of this communication. Our main result shows that there exists a simple ranking-based contract that implements both desiderata in a wide set of situations.
0022-0531
261-304
Gershkov, Alex
214a0b5e-c742-486d-b910-c8ec702c943a
Li, Jianpei
42aa7843-130f-430e-b354-c4b0608a93ac
Schweinzer, Paul
003ec8c8-a450-490e-a975-ba67fc0736a4
Gershkov, Alex
214a0b5e-c742-486d-b910-c8ec702c943a
Li, Jianpei
42aa7843-130f-430e-b354-c4b0608a93ac
Schweinzer, Paul
003ec8c8-a450-490e-a975-ba67fc0736a4

Gershkov, Alex, Li, Jianpei and Schweinzer, Paul (2016) How to share it out: the value of information in teams. Journal of Economic Theory, 162, 261-304. (doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.013).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We study the role of information exchange, leadership, and coordination in team and partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes—a “team”—as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once each team member decides on whether or not to share his private information truthfully, he chooses which effort to exert in the joint production process. This effort, however, is not contractible: only the realized output (or profit) of the team can be observed. Our central question is whether or not incentives can be provided to a team in this environment such that team members communicate their private information and exert efficient productive efforts on the basis of this communication. Our main result shows that there exists a simple ranking-based contract that implements both desiderata in a wide set of situations.

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More information

Published date: 1 March 2016

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 503675
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/503675
ISSN: 0022-0531
PURE UUID: 4af03921-d014-42b2-8841-35002b29ab6e
ORCID for Alex Gershkov: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6062-8428

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Date deposited: 08 Aug 2025 16:41
Last modified: 09 Aug 2025 02:19

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Contributors

Author: Alex Gershkov ORCID iD
Author: Jianpei Li
Author: Paul Schweinzer

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