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Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition

Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
0022-0531
36-68
Gershkov, Alex
214a0b5e-c742-486d-b910-c8ec702c943a
Szentes, Balázs
f2224a49-54c2-4831-a067-bdd7b40c9987
Gershkov, Alex
214a0b5e-c742-486d-b910-c8ec702c943a
Szentes, Balázs
f2224a49-54c2-4831-a067-bdd7b40c9987

Gershkov, Alex and Szentes, Balázs (2009) Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition. Journal of Economic Theory, 144 (1), 36-68.

Record type: Article

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Published date: 2009

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 503767
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/503767
ISSN: 0022-0531
PURE UUID: 330a39e8-5f09-4317-9c14-a4f76d71ff6d
ORCID for Alex Gershkov: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6062-8428

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Date deposited: 12 Aug 2025 17:13
Last modified: 13 Aug 2025 03:04

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Contributors

Author: Alex Gershkov ORCID iD
Author: Balázs Szentes

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