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Voting with interdependent values: the condorcet winner

Voting with interdependent values: the condorcet winner
Voting with interdependent values: the condorcet winner
We generalize the standard, private values voting model with single-peaked preferences and incomplete information by introducing interdependent preferences. Our main results show how standard mechanisms that are outcome-equivalent and implement the Condorcet winner under complete information or under private values yield starkly different outcomes if values are interdependent. We also propose a new notion of Condorcet winner under incomplete information and interdependent preferences, and discuss its implementation. The new phenomena in this paper arise because different voting rules (including dynamic ones) induce different processes of information aggregation and learning.
0899-8256
193-208
Gershkov, Alex
214a0b5e-c742-486d-b910-c8ec702c943a
Kleiner, Andreas
fb64c21d-161f-46ce-b0c7-2ce1e5c4c348
Moldovanu, Benny
f84fdd42-3143-4219-be24-fb26385b106d
Shi, Xianwen
a001fef0-d213-4d78-8447-50a9ca6e359f
Gershkov, Alex
214a0b5e-c742-486d-b910-c8ec702c943a
Kleiner, Andreas
fb64c21d-161f-46ce-b0c7-2ce1e5c4c348
Moldovanu, Benny
f84fdd42-3143-4219-be24-fb26385b106d
Shi, Xianwen
a001fef0-d213-4d78-8447-50a9ca6e359f

Gershkov, Alex, Kleiner, Andreas, Moldovanu, Benny and Shi, Xianwen (2023) Voting with interdependent values: the condorcet winner. Games and Economic Behavior, 142, 193-208. (doi:10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.004).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We generalize the standard, private values voting model with single-peaked preferences and incomplete information by introducing interdependent preferences. Our main results show how standard mechanisms that are outcome-equivalent and implement the Condorcet winner under complete information or under private values yield starkly different outcomes if values are interdependent. We also propose a new notion of Condorcet winner under incomplete information and interdependent preferences, and discuss its implementation. The new phenomena in this paper arise because different voting rules (including dynamic ones) induce different processes of information aggregation and learning.

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Published date: 21 August 2023

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 503781
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/503781
ISSN: 0899-8256
PURE UUID: 08f5e02b-6330-4c5d-be11-e28fda8e4671
ORCID for Alex Gershkov: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6062-8428

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Date deposited: 12 Aug 2025 17:15
Last modified: 13 Aug 2025 03:04

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Contributors

Author: Alex Gershkov ORCID iD
Author: Andreas Kleiner
Author: Benny Moldovanu
Author: Xianwen Shi

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