The ‘me’ in meat: does affirming the self make eating animals seem more morally wrong?
The ‘me’ in meat: does affirming the self make eating animals seem more morally wrong?
People typically extend limited moral standing to animals reared for food. Prominent perspectives in the literature on animal-human relations characterize this phenomenon as an outcome of moral disengagement: in other words, a strategy that protects people from moral self-condemnation. To provide a direct test of this hypothesis, we exposed people to a self-affirmation manipulation, and hypothesized that this would lead them to be more critical of their own meat eating and be more appreciative of animals' minds and suffering. Three experiments tested this idea in meat-eaters from the United Kingdom. Two initial experiments (n = 244, n = 247) found that affirming the self made eating animals seem more morally wrong. However, a subsequent pre-registered experiment (n = 719) failed to replicate this effect. In addition, this experiment found no effects of the affirmation procedure on specific beliefs about eating animals that participants consume compared to animals they do not consume. A mini-meta analysis of all the experiments found only weak evidence in support of the idea that affirming the self makes eating meat seem more morally wrong. There was no evidence that the affirmation procedure affected beliefs about animal minds.
Animals, Meat, Morality, Self-affirmation
Leach, Stefan
6bdc5639-c135-46b8-bcf9-2dd00646ee9a
Sutton, Robbie M.
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Douglas, Karen M.
78c9d691-a5f2-414e-a952-20ce83b95f13
Dhont, Kristof
25b2d39a-2ad1-4546-b507-76f6aa5af01b
9 April 2021
Leach, Stefan
6bdc5639-c135-46b8-bcf9-2dd00646ee9a
Sutton, Robbie M.
c5c423f8-fc77-4778-9666-8fb0c1fc42b0
Douglas, Karen M.
78c9d691-a5f2-414e-a952-20ce83b95f13
Dhont, Kristof
25b2d39a-2ad1-4546-b507-76f6aa5af01b
Leach, Stefan, Sutton, Robbie M., Douglas, Karen M. and Dhont, Kristof
(2021)
The ‘me’ in meat: does affirming the self make eating animals seem more morally wrong?
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 95, [104135].
(doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104135).
Abstract
People typically extend limited moral standing to animals reared for food. Prominent perspectives in the literature on animal-human relations characterize this phenomenon as an outcome of moral disengagement: in other words, a strategy that protects people from moral self-condemnation. To provide a direct test of this hypothesis, we exposed people to a self-affirmation manipulation, and hypothesized that this would lead them to be more critical of their own meat eating and be more appreciative of animals' minds and suffering. Three experiments tested this idea in meat-eaters from the United Kingdom. Two initial experiments (n = 244, n = 247) found that affirming the self made eating animals seem more morally wrong. However, a subsequent pre-registered experiment (n = 719) failed to replicate this effect. In addition, this experiment found no effects of the affirmation procedure on specific beliefs about eating animals that participants consume compared to animals they do not consume. A mini-meta analysis of all the experiments found only weak evidence in support of the idea that affirming the self makes eating meat seem more morally wrong. There was no evidence that the affirmation procedure affected beliefs about animal minds.
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Accepted/In Press date: 14 March 2021
e-pub ahead of print date: 9 April 2021
Published date: 9 April 2021
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Publisher Copyright:
© 2021
Keywords:
Animals, Meat, Morality, Self-affirmation
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Local EPrints ID: 503890
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/503890
ISSN: 0022-1031
PURE UUID: 22538848-8241-4819-8edd-9a2810b4a8da
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Date deposited: 15 Aug 2025 16:48
Last modified: 16 Aug 2025 02:16
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Contributors
Author:
Stefan Leach
Author:
Robbie M. Sutton
Author:
Karen M. Douglas
Author:
Kristof Dhont
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