Causal emergence and epiphenomenal emergence
Causal emergence and epiphenomenal emergence
According to one conception of strong emergence, strongly emergent properties are nomologically necessitated by their base properties and have novel causal powers relative to them. In this paper, I raise a difficulty for this conception of strong emergence, arguing that these two features (i.e., nomological necessitation and causal novelty) are incompatible. Instead of presenting this as an objection to the friends of strong emergence, I argue that this indicates that there are distinct varieties of strong emergence: causal emergence and epiphenomenal emergence. I then explore the prospects of emergentism with this distinction in the background.
891-904
Baysan, Umut
69cc8c93-08a0-4b88-8192-eb5a22fa82e3
23 August 2018
Baysan, Umut
69cc8c93-08a0-4b88-8192-eb5a22fa82e3
Abstract
According to one conception of strong emergence, strongly emergent properties are nomologically necessitated by their base properties and have novel causal powers relative to them. In this paper, I raise a difficulty for this conception of strong emergence, arguing that these two features (i.e., nomological necessitation and causal novelty) are incompatible. Instead of presenting this as an objection to the friends of strong emergence, I argue that this indicates that there are distinct varieties of strong emergence: causal emergence and epiphenomenal emergence. I then explore the prospects of emergentism with this distinction in the background.
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Accepted/In Press date: 23 August 2018
Published date: 23 August 2018
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Local EPrints ID: 505110
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/505110
ISSN: 0165-0106
PURE UUID: e2a98a38-7a5f-46a8-a72b-631a6202dd98
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Date deposited: 29 Sep 2025 17:37
Last modified: 30 Sep 2025 02:25
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Author:
Umut Baysan
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