Why incompatibilism about mental causation is incompatible with non-reductive physicalism
Why incompatibilism about mental causation is incompatible with non-reductive physicalism
The exclusion problem is meant to show that non-reductive physicalism leads to epiphenomenalism: if mental properties are not identical with physical properties, then they are not causally efficacious. Defenders of a difference-making account of causation suggest that the exclusion problem can be solved because mental properties can be difference-making causes of physical effects. Here, we focus on what we dub an incompatibilist implementation of this general strategy and argue against it from a non-reductive physicalist perspective. Specifically, we argue that incompatibilism undermines either the non-reductionist or the physicalist aspirations of non-reductive physicalism.
mental causation, non-reductive physicalism, causal exclusion
546-568
Christensen, Jonas
9079ffb2-29a7-4aef-9120-4fa7e9688dbf
Baysan, Umut
69cc8c93-08a0-4b88-8192-eb5a22fa82e3
18 December 2018
Christensen, Jonas
9079ffb2-29a7-4aef-9120-4fa7e9688dbf
Baysan, Umut
69cc8c93-08a0-4b88-8192-eb5a22fa82e3
Christensen, Jonas and Baysan, Umut
(2018)
Why incompatibilism about mental causation is incompatible with non-reductive physicalism.
Inquiry, 65, .
(doi:10.1080/0020174X.2018.1560362).
Abstract
The exclusion problem is meant to show that non-reductive physicalism leads to epiphenomenalism: if mental properties are not identical with physical properties, then they are not causally efficacious. Defenders of a difference-making account of causation suggest that the exclusion problem can be solved because mental properties can be difference-making causes of physical effects. Here, we focus on what we dub an incompatibilist implementation of this general strategy and argue against it from a non-reductive physicalist perspective. Specifically, we argue that incompatibilism undermines either the non-reductionist or the physicalist aspirations of non-reductive physicalism.
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Published date: 18 December 2018
Keywords:
mental causation, non-reductive physicalism, causal exclusion
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Local EPrints ID: 505302
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/505302
ISSN: 0020-174X
PURE UUID: c5f36e82-de9f-4b4a-b5ee-0d8954eff544
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Date deposited: 06 Oct 2025 16:48
Last modified: 07 Oct 2025 02:17
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Author:
Jonas Christensen
Author:
Umut Baysan
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