Rejecting epiphobia
Rejecting epiphobia
Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these objections, and thus against the negative dialectical role that the view plays in philosophy of mind. I argue that nearly in all cases where a theory implies one kind of epiphenomenalism, it is an epiphenomenalism of a non-problematic kind, at least as far as issues about agency and self-knowledge are concerned. There is indeed a problematic version of epiphenomenalism, but that version is not relevant to the debates where its apparent absurdity is invoked.
epiphenomenalism, mental causation
2773-2791
Baysan, Umut
69cc8c93-08a0-4b88-8192-eb5a22fa82e3
21 October 2020
Baysan, Umut
69cc8c93-08a0-4b88-8192-eb5a22fa82e3
Abstract
Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these objections, and thus against the negative dialectical role that the view plays in philosophy of mind. I argue that nearly in all cases where a theory implies one kind of epiphenomenalism, it is an epiphenomenalism of a non-problematic kind, at least as far as issues about agency and self-knowledge are concerned. There is indeed a problematic version of epiphenomenalism, but that version is not relevant to the debates where its apparent absurdity is invoked.
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Accepted/In Press date: 10 October 2020
Published date: 21 October 2020
Keywords:
epiphenomenalism, mental causation
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Local EPrints ID: 505307
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/505307
ISSN: 0039-7857
PURE UUID: 8ae2a321-d2a5-475d-b082-b9fa66bb9fb8
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Date deposited: 06 Oct 2025 16:54
Last modified: 07 Oct 2025 02:17
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Author:
Umut Baysan
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