Arguing about moral causation

Abstract

Here is an influential argument for naturalism: moral properties play causal roles in the natural world, and only naturalism can explain this phenomenon of “moral causation”. Here, I show that this argument from moral causation cannot be maintained. More specifically, the argument relies on the premise that only natural properties can play causal roles in the natural world, but based on the existing dialectic, the most likely way of defending that premise requires accepting claims about causation that generate difficulties for naturalists’ attempts to explain moral causation. Moreover, there are reasons to replace the premise that moral properties play causal roles with the more general claim that moral properties play explanatory roles, and such roles may or may not be causal roles. When the argument is suitably revised, it supports the more general thesis that moral properties are real, which leaves it open that they may or may not be natural properties.

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ORCID for Umut Baysan: orcid.org/0000-0002-1975-0739

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