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Should we take virtuous acts as evaluatively and conceptually primary?

Should we take virtuous acts as evaluatively and conceptually primary?
Should we take virtuous acts as evaluatively and conceptually primary?
Just as virtue ethics considers what a good person ought to look like, so responsibilist virtue epistemology investigates what a good inquirer should be. Central to both fields, though, is the role that character traits play. In this paper, I critically respond to Müller’s claim that we should instead give acts, and not character traits, this evaluative and conceptual primacy in virtue responsibilism.
Epistemic virtue, resonsibilism, acts, fleeting, success
2471-9560
40-46
Matthews, Taylor
fe7b28dd-5d3d-4cb5-a464-66c5a1e83e6d
Matthews, Taylor
fe7b28dd-5d3d-4cb5-a464-66c5a1e83e6d

Matthews, Taylor (2025) Should we take virtuous acts as evaluatively and conceptually primary? Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 14 (8), 40-46.

Record type: Article

Abstract

Just as virtue ethics considers what a good person ought to look like, so responsibilist virtue epistemology investigates what a good inquirer should be. Central to both fields, though, is the role that character traits play. In this paper, I critically respond to Müller’s claim that we should instead give acts, and not character traits, this evaluative and conceptual primacy in virtue responsibilism.

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Published date: 15 August 2025
Keywords: Epistemic virtue, resonsibilism, acts, fleeting, success

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Local EPrints ID: 505376
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/505376
ISSN: 2471-9560
PURE UUID: 52c41536-1670-4ae2-8b21-0848b51dcd8c

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Date deposited: 07 Oct 2025 16:52
Last modified: 07 Oct 2025 16:52

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Author: Taylor Matthews

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