CEO inside debt and corporate political disclosure
CEO inside debt and corporate political disclosure
This paper investigates the impact of CEO inside debt holdings on corporate political disclosure (CPD) using a sample of S&P 500 firms. Our results indicate that inside debt holdings motivate CEOs to enhance CPD. These findings are robust across various proxies and endogeneity tests. Our mediation analysis shows that CEOs with high levels of inside debt use CPD to reduce the firm’s probability of default, improve the firm’s information environment, protect corporate reputation, and secure more favorable debt contracting terms. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that the effect of CEO inside debt on CPD is stronger in financially constrained firms and in firms headquartered in more corrupt states, and it is more pronounced among Democratic CEOs compared to Republican CEOs. Overall, these findings highlight the significance of CEO incentive structures in shaping corporate disclosures.
CEO inside debt holdings, Corporate political disclosure, Deferred compensation, Risk-taking
Nasr, Mahmoud Abdelhamid Mahmoud
34ccec15-cdf4-43ba-a2fe-3bdb1426b3d9
Zalata, Alaa
0fc2c56d-97ad-44ce-ab31-63ca335dcef6
Vithana, Krishanthi
f6916e65-2c61-43ab-8ce3-897a2f8b6591
Guan, Jinghan
d40c4e5a-0cba-4175-9e0b-3d474c466a6a
Elmahgoub, Mohamed
bf66be6b-835d-42c0-97cd-ec717922c916
3 November 2025
Nasr, Mahmoud Abdelhamid Mahmoud
34ccec15-cdf4-43ba-a2fe-3bdb1426b3d9
Zalata, Alaa
0fc2c56d-97ad-44ce-ab31-63ca335dcef6
Vithana, Krishanthi
f6916e65-2c61-43ab-8ce3-897a2f8b6591
Guan, Jinghan
d40c4e5a-0cba-4175-9e0b-3d474c466a6a
Elmahgoub, Mohamed
bf66be6b-835d-42c0-97cd-ec717922c916
Nasr, Mahmoud Abdelhamid Mahmoud, Zalata, Alaa, Vithana, Krishanthi, Guan, Jinghan and Elmahgoub, Mohamed
(2025)
CEO inside debt and corporate political disclosure.
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 54, [107378].
(doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107378).
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of CEO inside debt holdings on corporate political disclosure (CPD) using a sample of S&P 500 firms. Our results indicate that inside debt holdings motivate CEOs to enhance CPD. These findings are robust across various proxies and endogeneity tests. Our mediation analysis shows that CEOs with high levels of inside debt use CPD to reduce the firm’s probability of default, improve the firm’s information environment, protect corporate reputation, and secure more favorable debt contracting terms. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that the effect of CEO inside debt on CPD is stronger in financially constrained firms and in firms headquartered in more corrupt states, and it is more pronounced among Democratic CEOs compared to Republican CEOs. Overall, these findings highlight the significance of CEO incentive structures in shaping corporate disclosures.
Text
Accepted version 21_10_2025
- Accepted Manuscript
Restricted to Repository staff only
Request a copy
Text
1-s2.0-S0278425425000973-main
- Version of Record
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 21 October 2025
Published date: 3 November 2025
Keywords:
CEO inside debt holdings, Corporate political disclosure, Deferred compensation, Risk-taking
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 506400
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/506400
ISSN: 0278-4254
PURE UUID: 58f39f62-42e0-4d69-b0be-3b35af3040cf
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 05 Nov 2025 18:09
Last modified: 18 Nov 2025 02:59
Export record
Altmetrics
Contributors
Author:
Mahmoud Abdelhamid Mahmoud Nasr
Author:
Jinghan Guan
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics