The politics of the 'Brussels Effect' narrative
The politics of the 'Brussels Effect' narrative
The Chapter revisits the Brussels Effect at a time of heightened transatlantic tensions about the legitimacy of EU regulation of US platforms. Its central argument is that the Brussels Effect narrative does not simply provide an objective, politically neutral account of European regulatory activism, but a meta-narrative that pushes a political agenda of the illegitimate extraterritoriality of EU regulation: who is Europe to dictate to the world (but really to the US) how to regulate global (online) trade. In response, the Chapter argues that Europe’s regulatory activism of the information economy must not be understood as an offensive extraterritorial strategy, but as a defensive territorial one. This defensive strategy seeks to counter, in Europe, the hegemony of US platforms and US laissez faire law (e.g. s 230 Communications Decency Act and First Amendment jurisprudence) which has reverberated around the globe, and which also explains why other States have had an interest in following the European regulatory lead. European platform regulation is a pushback against the Washington Effect, that is the US’s de facto and de jure export of its deregulatory laws to the rest of the world. The Washington Effect provides a counter-narrative on the EU-US tensions on the information economy. So although the Brussels Effect has been a successful grand narrative, it perverts the geo-political reality and disguises Washington as the real centre of (de)regulatory power.
Brussels Effect, Intermediary Immunities, First Amendment, platform liability, platform immunities, protectionism
Kohl, Uta
813ff335-441f-4027-801b-4e6fc48409c3
Kohl, Uta
813ff335-441f-4027-801b-4e6fc48409c3
Kohl, Uta
(2025)
The politics of the 'Brussels Effect' narrative.
In,
Koltay, András, Krotoszynski, Ron and Török, Bernát
(eds.)
Across the Great Divide: Platform Regulation in the United States and Europe.
Oxford University Press.
(In Press)
Record type:
Book Section
Abstract
The Chapter revisits the Brussels Effect at a time of heightened transatlantic tensions about the legitimacy of EU regulation of US platforms. Its central argument is that the Brussels Effect narrative does not simply provide an objective, politically neutral account of European regulatory activism, but a meta-narrative that pushes a political agenda of the illegitimate extraterritoriality of EU regulation: who is Europe to dictate to the world (but really to the US) how to regulate global (online) trade. In response, the Chapter argues that Europe’s regulatory activism of the information economy must not be understood as an offensive extraterritorial strategy, but as a defensive territorial one. This defensive strategy seeks to counter, in Europe, the hegemony of US platforms and US laissez faire law (e.g. s 230 Communications Decency Act and First Amendment jurisprudence) which has reverberated around the globe, and which also explains why other States have had an interest in following the European regulatory lead. European platform regulation is a pushback against the Washington Effect, that is the US’s de facto and de jure export of its deregulatory laws to the rest of the world. The Washington Effect provides a counter-narrative on the EU-US tensions on the information economy. So although the Brussels Effect has been a successful grand narrative, it perverts the geo-political reality and disguises Washington as the real centre of (de)regulatory power.
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More information
Accepted/In Press date: 3 November 2025
Keywords:
Brussels Effect, Intermediary Immunities, First Amendment, platform liability, platform immunities, protectionism
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 506857
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/506857
PURE UUID: 862ddc4e-c5a8-4d81-aaa3-c2f748a7f302
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 19 Nov 2025 17:36
Last modified: 20 Nov 2025 02:54
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Contributors
Editor:
András Koltay
Editor:
Ron Krotoszynski
Editor:
Bernát Török
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