Centralised by design: anglocentric constitutionalism, accountability and the failure of English devolution

Abstract

The Labour manifesto in this year's election implied a radical restructuring of the UK state, the way in which England is governed and in relations across the United Kingdom. The aim of making English devolution the ‘default option’ is set against fifty years of unsuccessful and partial devolution initiatives which have failed to reverse the accretion of power in the central UK state. Centralisation can be seen as the consequence of an Anglocentric constitutionalism which vests power in the centre, underpins England's fragmented departmental governance and where accountability mechanisms flow to HM Treasury. Labour's success will reflect its willingness to challenge these constitutional assumptions, which are deeply embedded in the culture, practice and structures of Westminster and Whitehall. Successful devolution will require breaking the chains of accountability that tie local spending decisions to the centre and placing devolved English local government on a stronger constitutional basis.

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ORCID for John Denham: orcid.org/0000-0002-1716-5085

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