Falling short? English Devolution Policy, OECD evidence and constitutional change

Abstract

The Labour Government’s English Devolution Policy (EDP) as set out in the English Devolution White Paper Power and Partnership: Foundations for Growth (EDWP) and the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (EDCE Bill) adds further complexity to the already asymmetric devolution settlement across the UK. Here, we assess this devolution policy against two key objectives set by the EDWP. First it claims to create a long-term constitutional settlement for England which will address the constitutional gap in sub-national delegation apparent since the 1998 UK devolution settlement. Second, the government objective is for growth, as set out in the Prime Minister’s Growth Mission and Plan for Change. To achieve both objectives, the EDWP purports to rely on evidence from the OECD on the conditions within which sub-national territories can achieve growth and contribute to national GDP. The article examines how far the proposed reforms of sub-national government in England Devolution Policy actually reflect the evidence of the OECD research. It finds the EDP only partially reflects OECD guidance, suggesting that the impact of EDP on both democratic and economic objectives will be limited.

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ORCID for John Denham: orcid.org/0000-0002-1716-5085

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