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Against a moral duty to make the future go best

Against a moral duty to make the future go best
Against a moral duty to make the future go best
On the utilitarian view on duties towards future generations, we should do what maximizes welfare across generations. This view has implausible implications: it is very demanding, and it can justify doing harm to present people for the greater (far-future) good. To avoid these implications, proponents of the utilitarian view can restrict the scope of their view to cases in which deontological constraints and prerogatives are not violated. In this chapter, I argue that the resulting constrained utilitarianism about duties towards future generations remains at odds with key deontological commitments. Accepting deontological constraints and prerogatives, properly understood, requires giving up, not merely reining in, utilitarianism about future generations.
139-149
Oxford University Press
Unruh, Charlotte Franziska
a13ae482-e199-48eb-afd3-27fb09d2fb9e
Greaves, Hilary
Barrett, Jacob
Thorstad, David
Unruh, Charlotte Franziska
a13ae482-e199-48eb-afd3-27fb09d2fb9e
Greaves, Hilary
Barrett, Jacob
Thorstad, David

Unruh, Charlotte Franziska (2025) Against a moral duty to make the future go best. In, Greaves, Hilary, Barrett, Jacob and Thorstad, David (eds.) Essays on Longtermism. Oxford University Press, pp. 139-149. (doi:10.1093/9780191979972.003.0009).

Record type: Book Section

Abstract

On the utilitarian view on duties towards future generations, we should do what maximizes welfare across generations. This view has implausible implications: it is very demanding, and it can justify doing harm to present people for the greater (far-future) good. To avoid these implications, proponents of the utilitarian view can restrict the scope of their view to cases in which deontological constraints and prerogatives are not violated. In this chapter, I argue that the resulting constrained utilitarianism about duties towards future generations remains at odds with key deontological commitments. Accepting deontological constraints and prerogatives, properly understood, requires giving up, not merely reining in, utilitarianism about future generations.

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e-pub ahead of print date: 18 August 2025
Published date: 25 August 2025

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 507267
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/507267
PURE UUID: 10f18e88-5019-471d-bd9e-c32e8b5b2518
ORCID for Charlotte Franziska Unruh: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-3953-7617

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Date deposited: 02 Dec 2025 18:08
Last modified: 03 Dec 2025 03:08

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Contributors

Author: Charlotte Franziska Unruh ORCID iD
Editor: Hilary Greaves
Editor: Jacob Barrett
Editor: David Thorstad

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