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Suffering, retribution, and moral accountability in the contemporary life sentence

Suffering, retribution, and moral accountability in the contemporary life sentence
Suffering, retribution, and moral accountability in the contemporary life sentence
This chapter examines how life imprisonment fails to achieve its retributive purposes, using data from qualitative interviews with 194 life-sentenced prisoners in England and Wales. We demonstrate a fundamental contradiction: whilst life sentences effectively inflict suffering, this suffering obstructs the moral reflection that retributive theorists assume punishment facilitates.

We develop three interconnected arguments. First, while the acute anguish of early imprisonment produces a form of suffering that impedes the capacity for moral reflection, the ways that life-sentenced prisoners adjust to this suffering suppresses the moral emotions that promote accountability or leaves them in a relatively unformed state. Second, risk discourse creates an ‘actuarial morality system’ that transforms ethical questions into technical problems, privileging future harm prevention over engagement with past wrongdoing. Third, genuine moral reflection typically occurs through non-institutional channels—personal bereavement, faith practices, informal relationships—rather than formal programmes.

Our findings question some of the assumptions made by communicative accounts of retribution. We offer empirical support for Zaibert's (2018) critique of retributivist 'simple-mindedness', suggesting that legitimate punishment requires acknowledgement of irreducible moral conflicts. The contemporary life sentence, by necessitating emotional suppression and reducing ethical considerations to questions of risk management, mirrors the 'impoverished' theories of value Zaibert identifies in some philosophical justifications of punishment. Rather than facilitating dialogical moral communication (Duff, 2001) or symbolic vindication (Hampton, 1991), these sentences obstruct meaningful moral engagement. We conclude that life imprisonment functions less as legitimate punishment than as institutionalised vengeance, failing even on retributivist grounds.
life imprisonment, england & wales, penal theory, retributivism, moral communication, risk
Hart
Jarman, Ben
17792bef-9b37-408e-b734-acb707842715
Crewe, Ben
d5d8b0f0-6e1e-4163-86a4-4bb2286e4856
Zaibert, Leo
Liebling, Alison
Crewe, Ben
Jarman, Ben
17792bef-9b37-408e-b734-acb707842715
Crewe, Ben
d5d8b0f0-6e1e-4163-86a4-4bb2286e4856
Zaibert, Leo
Liebling, Alison
Crewe, Ben

Jarman, Ben and Crewe, Ben (2025) Suffering, retribution, and moral accountability in the contemporary life sentence. In, Zaibert, Leo, Liebling, Alison and Crewe, Ben (eds.) Do We Punish Too Much?: Punishment Theory Meets Punishment Practice. Hart. (Submitted)

Record type: Book Section

Abstract

This chapter examines how life imprisonment fails to achieve its retributive purposes, using data from qualitative interviews with 194 life-sentenced prisoners in England and Wales. We demonstrate a fundamental contradiction: whilst life sentences effectively inflict suffering, this suffering obstructs the moral reflection that retributive theorists assume punishment facilitates.

We develop three interconnected arguments. First, while the acute anguish of early imprisonment produces a form of suffering that impedes the capacity for moral reflection, the ways that life-sentenced prisoners adjust to this suffering suppresses the moral emotions that promote accountability or leaves them in a relatively unformed state. Second, risk discourse creates an ‘actuarial morality system’ that transforms ethical questions into technical problems, privileging future harm prevention over engagement with past wrongdoing. Third, genuine moral reflection typically occurs through non-institutional channels—personal bereavement, faith practices, informal relationships—rather than formal programmes.

Our findings question some of the assumptions made by communicative accounts of retribution. We offer empirical support for Zaibert's (2018) critique of retributivist 'simple-mindedness', suggesting that legitimate punishment requires acknowledgement of irreducible moral conflicts. The contemporary life sentence, by necessitating emotional suppression and reducing ethical considerations to questions of risk management, mirrors the 'impoverished' theories of value Zaibert identifies in some philosophical justifications of punishment. Rather than facilitating dialogical moral communication (Duff, 2001) or symbolic vindication (Hampton, 1991), these sentences obstruct meaningful moral engagement. We conclude that life imprisonment functions less as legitimate punishment than as institutionalised vengeance, failing even on retributivist grounds.

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2025-07-28 workshop draft - Author's Original
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Submitted date: 25 July 2025
Keywords: life imprisonment, england & wales, penal theory, retributivism, moral communication, risk

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 507475
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/507475
PURE UUID: 8447a766-9d20-401b-8529-b6838c716321
ORCID for Ben Jarman: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-3527-5437

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Date deposited: 10 Dec 2025 17:35
Last modified: 11 Dec 2025 03:14

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Contributors

Author: Ben Jarman ORCID iD
Author: Ben Crewe
Editor: Leo Zaibert
Editor: Alison Liebling
Editor: Ben Crewe

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