Effects of a politician’s reputation for providing electoral clientelism: a theory with evidence from Brazil
Effects of a politician’s reputation for providing electoral clientelism: a theory with evidence from Brazil
This article offers a new theory of how reputations for electoral clientelism affect voter behaviour. Existing accounts emphasise direct exchanges between candidates and clients, but often overlook how broader audiences evaluate these practices. We develop a formal model showing that voters’ preferences over clientelistic candidates are shaped by their trust in political institutions: when trust is low, voters—whether clients or not—may view clientelism as a credible signal of goodwill and effectiveness. When trust is high, they favour programmatic candidates instead. We test the model’s predictions through a conjoint survey experiment conducted with 2148 Brazilian voters. We find that reputations for clientelism increase electoral support, especially among citizens with lower institutional trust. The findings advance theories of clientelism and electoral accountability by incorporating public perceptions, not just private exchanges, into the strategic calculus of candidates and voters.
Brazil, Clientelism, Machine politics, Public opinion, Trust in government, Voting behaviour
Mello, Eduardo
933b36c7-e4c6-4f45-8d3e-bac0d73a9c01
Jennings, Will
2ab3f11c-eb7f-44c6-9ef2-3180c1a954f7
Mckay, Lawrence
4ecf2fd8-3fbf-4a3c-9c22-6856fc1a09be
Montagner, Oto
11320733-30cc-4003-a312-d5286e362b8d
10 January 2026
Mello, Eduardo
933b36c7-e4c6-4f45-8d3e-bac0d73a9c01
Jennings, Will
2ab3f11c-eb7f-44c6-9ef2-3180c1a954f7
Mckay, Lawrence
4ecf2fd8-3fbf-4a3c-9c22-6856fc1a09be
Montagner, Oto
11320733-30cc-4003-a312-d5286e362b8d
Mello, Eduardo, Jennings, Will, Mckay, Lawrence and Montagner, Oto
(2026)
Effects of a politician’s reputation for providing electoral clientelism: a theory with evidence from Brazil.
Electoral Studies, 99, [103043].
(doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2026.103043).
Abstract
This article offers a new theory of how reputations for electoral clientelism affect voter behaviour. Existing accounts emphasise direct exchanges between candidates and clients, but often overlook how broader audiences evaluate these practices. We develop a formal model showing that voters’ preferences over clientelistic candidates are shaped by their trust in political institutions: when trust is low, voters—whether clients or not—may view clientelism as a credible signal of goodwill and effectiveness. When trust is high, they favour programmatic candidates instead. We test the model’s predictions through a conjoint survey experiment conducted with 2148 Brazilian voters. We find that reputations for clientelism increase electoral support, especially among citizens with lower institutional trust. The findings advance theories of clientelism and electoral accountability by incorporating public perceptions, not just private exchanges, into the strategic calculus of candidates and voters.
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Demand_for_Clientelism_article
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Accepted/In Press date: 3 January 2026
Published date: 10 January 2026
Keywords:
Brazil, Clientelism, Machine politics, Public opinion, Trust in government, Voting behaviour
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 509509
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/509509
ISSN: 0261-3794
PURE UUID: aa949ceb-30fb-47de-96a0-c72f62d8c404
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Date deposited: 24 Feb 2026 17:52
Last modified: 07 Mar 2026 04:04
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Author:
Eduardo Mello
Author:
Oto Montagner
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