Multi-domain deception for enhanced security in automotive networks

Abstract

As the automotive industry increasingly integrates digital technologies, the threat of cyberattacks has emerged as a critical concern. In this work, we propose two distinct cyber deception strategies: reactive deception, which leverages multi-domain architectures to mitigate remote attacks, and proactive deception, focused on the strategic allocation of honeypots. The reactive approach addresses coordination and synchronization challenges in interconnected automotive systems by implementing an interdependent deception framework, thereby enhancing protection against multi-faceted cyber threats. In contrast, the proactive strategy employs a multi-objective optimization framework to allocate honeypots effectively, achieving Pareto Nash equilibrium solutions that balance competing defense objectives. We quantitatively compare our multi-domain reactive approach with traditional single-domain strategies, demonstrating significant defensive advantages in complex, cross-domain attack scenarios. Experimental results reveal that the multi-domain strategy improves defense effectiveness by approximately 19% compared to conventional methods.

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ORCID for Alain Zemkoho: orcid.org/0000-0003-1265-4178

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