The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Privacy law and the dead - a reappraisal (part 11)

Privacy law and the dead - a reappraisal (part 11)
Privacy law and the dead - a reappraisal (part 11)
In an earlier article, we argued that post-mortem privacy is not sufficiently protected (if at all) in the laws of England and Wales. Therefore, we suggested that post-mortem privacy protection or right could be developed along the lines of medical confidentiality and post-mortem copyright which endures beyond death. We argued that this evolutional trajectory could be conceptually underpinned by certain theories of post-mortem interests and harm, as well as European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR’s) jurisprudence on positive obligations. In this article, we deepen and extend the theoretical analysis and support for a post-mortem privacy interest or right. Specifically, we draw from Boonin’s posthumous harm thesis (PHT) and posthumous wrong thesis (PWT) to develop a framework and rationale for justifying the recognition and enforcement of a privacy right post-mortem. Essentially, our theoretical framework suggests that, just as a living person can be harmed by an act that does not have any effect on their conscious experience, such as the frustration of their desires, the dead can also suffer unfelt harm. We test and illustrate the analytical and explanatory power of this theoretical framework with a USA post-mortem privacy case and five relevant practical examples that apply throughout the analysis. Furthermore, we examine some important cases in England and Wales to show how the use of our framework could lead to the recognition and justification of a privacy right post-mortem. We repeat this analytical strategy for some relevant cases drawn from the ECtHR based on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR/Convention Rights). All of the above leads us to argue, and suggest, that a plausible case can be made for the existence and recognition of a post-mortem privacy right for the deceased, and a relational privacy right post-mortem for survivors.
privacy law, Privacy of the dead, Posthumous harm theories, Privacy harm, Relational privacy
1757-7632
Nwabueze, Remigius N.
6b2cdf07-8ee1-4d6f-9882-e3ea41e2aa0b
White, Matthew
5c7bf142-d479-40bc-8a10-7c49dd81adf5
Nwabueze, Remigius N.
6b2cdf07-8ee1-4d6f-9882-e3ea41e2aa0b
White, Matthew
5c7bf142-d479-40bc-8a10-7c49dd81adf5

Nwabueze, Remigius N. and White, Matthew (2026) Privacy law and the dead - a reappraisal (part 11). Journal of Media Law. (doi:10.1080/17577632.2026.2657763).

Record type: Article

Abstract

In an earlier article, we argued that post-mortem privacy is not sufficiently protected (if at all) in the laws of England and Wales. Therefore, we suggested that post-mortem privacy protection or right could be developed along the lines of medical confidentiality and post-mortem copyright which endures beyond death. We argued that this evolutional trajectory could be conceptually underpinned by certain theories of post-mortem interests and harm, as well as European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR’s) jurisprudence on positive obligations. In this article, we deepen and extend the theoretical analysis and support for a post-mortem privacy interest or right. Specifically, we draw from Boonin’s posthumous harm thesis (PHT) and posthumous wrong thesis (PWT) to develop a framework and rationale for justifying the recognition and enforcement of a privacy right post-mortem. Essentially, our theoretical framework suggests that, just as a living person can be harmed by an act that does not have any effect on their conscious experience, such as the frustration of their desires, the dead can also suffer unfelt harm. We test and illustrate the analytical and explanatory power of this theoretical framework with a USA post-mortem privacy case and five relevant practical examples that apply throughout the analysis. Furthermore, we examine some important cases in England and Wales to show how the use of our framework could lead to the recognition and justification of a privacy right post-mortem. We repeat this analytical strategy for some relevant cases drawn from the ECtHR based on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR/Convention Rights). All of the above leads us to argue, and suggest, that a plausible case can be made for the existence and recognition of a post-mortem privacy right for the deceased, and a relational privacy right post-mortem for survivors.

Text
Privacy law and the dead a reappraisal part II - Version of Record
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.
Download (983kB)

More information

Accepted/In Press date: 3 April 2026
e-pub ahead of print date: 15 April 2026
Keywords: privacy law, Privacy of the dead, Posthumous harm theories, Privacy harm, Relational privacy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 511179
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/511179
ISSN: 1757-7632
PURE UUID: 2f12e94a-6246-49fb-8e27-781efcc63782
ORCID for Remigius N. Nwabueze: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-3100-6427

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 05 May 2026 17:27
Last modified: 06 May 2026 01:40

Export record

Altmetrics

Contributors

Author: Matthew White

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×