Dicing with life: an antinatalist argument for the immorality of procreation

Abstract

This thesis aims to develop a novel argument for the view that procreation is always morally impermissible. In the first half of my thesis, I identify the major problems facing the most popular existing arguments for the antinatalist conclusion I wish to defend – in particular, the arguments developed by the South African philosopher, David Benatar. Having shown that these arguments miss the mark, I present and explain the philosophical appeal of the risk argument for antinatalism. This argument states that almost all cases of procreation are immoral because they involve the imposition of significant risk on the individual brought into existence (the risk claim) in the absence of the two best justifications for risk imposition on others – namely, the absence of consent from the created being to being exposed to such risks (the no-consent claim) and the absence of any adequately compelling moral or practical reason to impose the risk (the no-necessity claim).

The second half of my thesis is devoted to examining a wide range of replies (both existing and possible) to the each of these three claims as well as the more central idea that the combination of these claims establishes an act as immoral. Some major objections I respond to include the view that procreative risk is acceptably imposed given the high likelihood that one’s offspring will enjoy a good life, that the invocation of consent in pre-natal contexts is metaphysically confused, and that the value of biological parenthood constitutes a compelling reason to procreate. I aim to demonstrate that these criticisms fall short of undermining the risk argument for antinatalism.

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Identifiers

ORCID for Harish Narayanan: orcid.org/0009-0003-7942-2467

ORCID for Fiona Woollard: orcid.org/0000-0001-5144-3379

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