Soft money and hard choices: why political parties might legislate against soft money donations
Soft money and hard choices: why political parties might legislate against soft money donations
In contrast to the bulk of the campaign finance literature that highlights political action committee (PAC) contributions and single donations, this paper emphasizes soft money and the rationale for dual contributions. Employing a formal model of unregulated contributions and political access, we show that donors will rationally choose to contribute to both political parties. While the parties accept these dual contributions, they lead to an imbalance between the benefits of contributions and the costs of providing access. This race to acquire unlimited soft money leads to a situation where the parties agree to campaign finance reform legislation.
411-438
Gill, David
2319117f-b14e-48c6-8a33-34f5c9d4e2ea
Lipsmeyer, Christine S.
12b38ef2-7ea3-4dc2-990e-737d02df4b03
June 2005
Gill, David
2319117f-b14e-48c6-8a33-34f5c9d4e2ea
Lipsmeyer, Christine S.
12b38ef2-7ea3-4dc2-990e-737d02df4b03
Gill, David and Lipsmeyer, Christine S.
(2005)
Soft money and hard choices: why political parties might legislate against soft money donations.
Public Choice, 123 (3-4), .
(doi:10.1007/s11127-005-7169-y).
Abstract
In contrast to the bulk of the campaign finance literature that highlights political action committee (PAC) contributions and single donations, this paper emphasizes soft money and the rationale for dual contributions. Employing a formal model of unregulated contributions and political access, we show that donors will rationally choose to contribute to both political parties. While the parties accept these dual contributions, they lead to an imbalance between the benefits of contributions and the costs of providing access. This race to acquire unlimited soft money leads to a situation where the parties agree to campaign finance reform legislation.
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Published date: June 2005
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Local EPrints ID: 51790
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/51790
ISSN: 0048-5829
PURE UUID: 8c7f0af9-a42a-42c4-9a77-c87713aa7b24
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Date deposited: 29 May 2008
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 10:18
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Author:
David Gill
Author:
Christine S. Lipsmeyer
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