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Soft money and hard choices: why political parties might legislate against soft money donations

Soft money and hard choices: why political parties might legislate against soft money donations
Soft money and hard choices: why political parties might legislate against soft money donations
In contrast to the bulk of the campaign finance literature that highlights political action committee (PAC) contributions and single donations, this paper emphasizes soft money and the rationale for dual contributions. Employing a formal model of unregulated contributions and political access, we show that donors will rationally choose to contribute to both political parties. While the parties accept these dual contributions, they lead to an imbalance between the benefits of contributions and the costs of providing access. This race to acquire unlimited soft money leads to a situation where the parties agree to campaign finance reform legislation.
0048-5829
411-438
Gill, David
2319117f-b14e-48c6-8a33-34f5c9d4e2ea
Lipsmeyer, Christine S.
12b38ef2-7ea3-4dc2-990e-737d02df4b03
Gill, David
2319117f-b14e-48c6-8a33-34f5c9d4e2ea
Lipsmeyer, Christine S.
12b38ef2-7ea3-4dc2-990e-737d02df4b03

Gill, David and Lipsmeyer, Christine S. (2005) Soft money and hard choices: why political parties might legislate against soft money donations. Public Choice, 123 (3-4), 411-438. (doi:10.1007/s11127-005-7169-y).

Record type: Article

Abstract

In contrast to the bulk of the campaign finance literature that highlights political action committee (PAC) contributions and single donations, this paper emphasizes soft money and the rationale for dual contributions. Employing a formal model of unregulated contributions and political access, we show that donors will rationally choose to contribute to both political parties. While the parties accept these dual contributions, they lead to an imbalance between the benefits of contributions and the costs of providing access. This race to acquire unlimited soft money leads to a situation where the parties agree to campaign finance reform legislation.

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More information

Published date: June 2005

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 51790
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/51790
ISSN: 0048-5829
PURE UUID: 8c7f0af9-a42a-42c4-9a77-c87713aa7b24

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 29 May 2008
Last modified: 13 Mar 2019 20:48

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