Soft money and hard choices: why political parties might legislate against soft money donations


Gill, David and Lipsmeyer, Christine S. (2005) Soft money and hard choices: why political parties might legislate against soft money donations Public Choice, 123, (3-4), pp. 411-438. (doi:10.1007/s11127-005-7169-y).

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Description/Abstract

In contrast to the bulk of the campaign finance literature that highlights political action committee (PAC) contributions and single donations, this paper emphasizes soft money and the rationale for dual contributions. Employing a formal model of unregulated contributions and political access, we show that donors will rationally choose to contribute to both political parties. While the parties accept these dual contributions, they lead to an imbalance between the benefits of contributions and the costs of providing access. This race to acquire unlimited soft money leads to a situation where the parties agree to campaign finance reform legislation.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1007/s11127-005-7169-y
ISSNs: 0048-5829 (print)
Subjects:
ePrint ID: 51790
Date :
Date Event
June 2005Published
Date Deposited: 29 May 2008
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 18:04
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/51790

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