Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a Walrasian auctioneer

Calvo-Pardo, Hector (2009) Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a Walrasian auctioneer. Economic Theory, 38 (3), 561-592. (doi:10.1007/s00199-007-0325-5).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We show that the “fear” of globalisation can be rationalised by economic theory in the standard AD/AS equilibrium model, if we substitute the coordinational role of the Auctioneer by an implementation device based on learning (Guesnerie in Am Econ Rev 82, 1254–1278, 1992). When endowing producers with a learning ability to forecast market prices, individual profit-maximizing production decisions become interdependent in a strategic sense (strategic substitutes). Performing basic comparative statics exercises, we show that “competitiveness” matters in a precise sense: as foreign producers gain access to the home market, home producers’ ability to forecast market prices is undermined, so being their ability to forecast the profit consequences of their production decisions. A standard open economy exercise shows that the efficiency gains triggered by increased competition have to be traded-off against higher uncertainty (a lower likelihood to coordinate upon the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium). We interpret it as a new rationale for the existence of barriers to trade targeting coordination, rather than protecting mere inefficient sectors or industries (political economy driven). Finally, we show that classical measures evaluating ex-ante the desirability of economic integration (net welfare gains) do not always advice free trade.

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