Spinoza, the No Shared Attribute thesis, and the principle of sufficient reason
Spinoza, the No Shared Attribute thesis, and the principle of sufficient reason
According to Spinoza, ‘In Nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute’. This ‘No Shared Attribute’ thesis, plays a crucial role in Spinoza’s argument for substance monism. Unfortunately, however, the case that Spinoza offers in support of the thesis faces a notorious objection, dating back to Leibniz. In this paper, after a brief reconstruction of Spinoza’s argument for substance monism, I suggest a novel response to the Leibnizian objection, one that is faithful both to the spirit of Spinoza’s work and to the letter.
spinoza, philosophy, monism, attribute, substance, leibniz
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
2011
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
(2011)
Spinoza, the No Shared Attribute thesis, and the principle of sufficient reason.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 19 (3).
(doi:10.1080/09608788.2011.563526).
Abstract
According to Spinoza, ‘In Nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute’. This ‘No Shared Attribute’ thesis, plays a crucial role in Spinoza’s argument for substance monism. Unfortunately, however, the case that Spinoza offers in support of the thesis faces a notorious objection, dating back to Leibniz. In this paper, after a brief reconstruction of Spinoza’s argument for substance monism, I suggest a novel response to the Leibnizian objection, one that is faithful both to the spirit of Spinoza’s work and to the letter.
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Spinoza,_the_no_shared_attribute_thesis,_and_the_principle_of_sufficient_reason_-_Daniel_Whiting.pdf
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Published date: 2011
Keywords:
spinoza, philosophy, monism, attribute, substance, leibniz
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Local EPrints ID: 66338
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/66338
ISSN: 0960-8788
PURE UUID: b18b867e-b7c2-44ce-97e7-231265647bbb
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Date deposited: 04 Jun 2009
Last modified: 13 Mar 2024 18:17
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