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Should I believe the truth?

Should I believe the truth?
Should I believe the truth?
Many philosophers hold that a general norm of truth governs the attitude of believing. In a recent and influential discussion, Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi raise a number of serious objections to this view. In this paper, I concede that Bykvist and Hattiangadi’s criticisms might be effective against the formulation of the norm of truth that they consider, but suggest that an alternative is available. After outlining that alternative, I argue that it is not vulnerable to objections parallel to those Bykvist and Hattiangadi advance, although it might initially appear to be. In closing, I consider what bearing the preceding discussion has on important questions concerning the natures of believing and of truth.
belief, truth, norm, normativity, correctness
0012-2017
213-224
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef

Whiting, Daniel (2010) Should I believe the truth? Dialectica, 64 (2), 213-224. (doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01204.x).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Many philosophers hold that a general norm of truth governs the attitude of believing. In a recent and influential discussion, Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi raise a number of serious objections to this view. In this paper, I concede that Bykvist and Hattiangadi’s criticisms might be effective against the formulation of the norm of truth that they consider, but suggest that an alternative is available. After outlining that alternative, I argue that it is not vulnerable to objections parallel to those Bykvist and Hattiangadi advance, although it might initially appear to be. In closing, I consider what bearing the preceding discussion has on important questions concerning the natures of believing and of truth.

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Submitted date: 14 August 2009
Accepted/In Press date: 14 August 2009
Published date: June 2010
Keywords: belief, truth, norm, normativity, correctness
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 67388
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/67388
ISSN: 0012-2017
PURE UUID: 7f6b3d03-3c1d-4b88-9502-ef5228411869

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Date deposited: 17 Aug 2009
Last modified: 13 Mar 2024 18:49

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