Should I believe the truth?

Whiting, Daniel (2009) Should I believe the truth? Dialectica, 64, (2), pp. 213-224. (doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01204.x).


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Many philosophers hold that a general norm of truth governs the attitude of believing. In a recent and influential discussion, Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi raise a number of serious objections to this view. In this paper, I concede that Bykvist and Hattiangadi’s criticisms might be effective against the formulation of the norm of truth that they consider, but suggest that an alternative is available. After outlining that alternative, I argue that it is not vulnerable to objections parallel to those Bykvist and Hattiangadi advance, although it might initially appear to be. In closing, I consider what bearing the preceding discussion has on important questions concerning the natures of believing and of truth.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01204.x
ISSNs: 0012-2017 (print)
Related URLs:
Keywords: belief, truth, norm, normativity, correctness
ePrint ID: 67388
Date :
Date Event
14 August 2009Submitted
14 August 2009Accepted/In Press
June 2010Published
Date Deposited: 17 Aug 2009
Last Modified: 18 Apr 2017 21:26
Further Information:Google Scholar

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