The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Admissibility and event-rationality

Barelli, Paulo and Galanis, Spyros (2013) Admissibility and event-rationality Games and Economic Behavior, 77, (1), pp. 21-40. (doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.012).

Record type: Article


We develop an approach to providing epistemic conditions for admissible behavior in games. Instead of using lexicographic beliefs to capture infinitely less likely conjectures, we postulate that players use tie-breaking sets to help decide among strategies that are outcome-equivalent given their conjectures. A player is event-rational if she best responds to a conjecture and uses a list of subsets of the other players? strategies to break ties among outcome-equivalent strategies. Using type spaces to capture interactive beliefs, we show that event-rationality and common belief of event-rationality (RCBER) imply S?W, the set of admissible strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies. By strengthening standard belief to validated belief, we show that event-rationality and common validated belief of event-rationality (RCvBER) imply IA, the iterated admissible strategies. We show that in complete, continuous and compact type structures, RCBER and RCvBER are nonempty, hence providing epistemic criteria for S?W and IA.

PDF admissibility.pdf - Author's Original
Download (362kB)

More information

e-pub ahead of print date: 11 September 2012
Published date: January 2013
Keywords: epistemic game theory, admissibility, iterated weak dominance, common knowledge, rationality, completeness
Organisations: Economics


Local EPrints ID: 71037
ISSN: 0899-8256
PURE UUID: e4d3a742-ee50-429c-9d66-4e02b942fa67
ORCID for Spyros Galanis: ORCID iD

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 14 Dec 2009
Last modified: 19 Jul 2017 00:02

Export record



Author: Paulo Barelli
Author: Spyros Galanis ORCID iD

University divisions

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton:

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.