Admissibility and event-rationality

Barelli, Paulo and Galanis, Spyros (2012) Admissibility and event-rationality Games and Economic Behavior, 77, (1), pp. 21-40. (doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.012).


[img] PDF admissibility.pdf - Author's Original
Download (362kB)


We develop an approach to providing epistemic conditions for admissible behavior in games. Instead of using lexicographic beliefs to capture infinitely less likely conjectures, we postulate that players use tie-breaking sets to help decide among strategies that are outcome-equivalent given their conjectures. A player is event-rational if she best responds to a conjecture and uses a list of subsets of the other players? strategies to break ties among outcome-equivalent strategies. Using type spaces to capture interactive beliefs, we show that event-rationality and common belief of event-rationality (RCBER) imply S?W, the set of admissible strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies. By strengthening standard belief to validated belief, we show that event-rationality and common validated belief of event-rationality (RCvBER) imply IA, the iterated admissible strategies. We show that in complete, continuous and compact type structures, RCBER and RCvBER are nonempty, hence providing epistemic criteria for S?W and IA.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.012
ISSNs: 0899-8256 (print)
Related URLs:
Keywords: epistemic game theory, admissibility, iterated weak dominance, common knowledge, rationality, completeness
ePrint ID: 71037
Date :
Date Event
11 September 2012e-pub ahead of print
January 2013Published
Date Deposited: 14 Dec 2009
Last Modified: 18 Apr 2017 21:05
Further Information:Google Scholar

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item