Trade liberalisation, market structure and the incentive to merge
Trade liberalisation, market structure and the incentive to merge
In this paper we consider whether a movement towards freer international
trade generates incentives for firms to merge and if so what forms of merger are most profitable. In a linear Cournot framework we show that a reduction in trade costs may, but will not necessarily, encourage mergers. Both market structure and the level to which trade costs fall are shown to play a decisive role. Domestic mergers will be encouraged only if the product market is not highly concentrated and trade costs fall below a threshold level. International mergers can be encouraged in any market structure, and are generally more profitable than domestic mergers.
merger, international trade, oligopoly
Stewart, Geoff
a94573f3-bb92-416f-ba18-3c6272224d18
Chalkley, Martin
95cf0a6c-4dc1-43c9-b32a-748ae8f05d26
Stewart, Geoff
a94573f3-bb92-416f-ba18-3c6272224d18
Chalkley, Martin
95cf0a6c-4dc1-43c9-b32a-748ae8f05d26
Stewart, Geoff and Chalkley, Martin
(2011)
Trade liberalisation, market structure and the incentive to merge.
Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics No 0916.
(doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2010.01325.x).
Abstract
In this paper we consider whether a movement towards freer international
trade generates incentives for firms to merge and if so what forms of merger are most profitable. In a linear Cournot framework we show that a reduction in trade costs may, but will not necessarily, encourage mergers. Both market structure and the level to which trade costs fall are shown to play a decisive role. Domestic mergers will be encouraged only if the product market is not highly concentrated and trade costs fall below a threshold level. International mergers can be encouraged in any market structure, and are generally more profitable than domestic mergers.
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e-pub ahead of print date: 2011
Keywords:
merger, international trade, oligopoly
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Local EPrints ID: 71046
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/71046
ISSN: 0966-4246
PURE UUID: 5a6c7c44-fdd6-425e-9351-523c8aa106e6
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Date deposited: 13 Jan 2010
Last modified: 13 Mar 2024 20:19
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Author:
Geoff Stewart
Author:
Martin Chalkley
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