International trade and the incentive for merger
International trade and the incentive for merger
This article examines the profitability of horizontal merger in an open economy with Cournot competition. We find that duopoly is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for domestic merger to be profitable. A cross-border merger, however, can be profitable from any market structure
Chalkley, Martin
95cf0a6c-4dc1-43c9-b32a-748ae8f05d26
Stewart, Geoff
a94573f3-bb92-416f-ba18-3c6272224d18
2 February 2010
Chalkley, Martin
95cf0a6c-4dc1-43c9-b32a-748ae8f05d26
Stewart, Geoff
a94573f3-bb92-416f-ba18-3c6272224d18
Abstract
This article examines the profitability of horizontal merger in an open economy with Cournot competition. We find that duopoly is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for domestic merger to be profitable. A cross-border merger, however, can be profitable from any market structure
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Published date: 2 February 2010
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 79222
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/79222
ISSN: 0003-6846
PURE UUID: 10143417-5fb2-441d-ba3c-b40843b77058
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Date deposited: 11 Mar 2010
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 00:28
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Author:
Martin Chalkley
Author:
Geoff Stewart
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