Particular and general: Wittgenstein, linguistic rules and context

Whiting, Daniel (2010) Particular and general: Wittgenstein, linguistic rules and context In, Whiting, Daniel (eds.) The Later Wittgenstein on Language. London, UK, Palgrave pp. 114-132. (Philosophers in Depth).

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Wittgenstein held two views which appear to be - and have been taken by many to be - incompatible. First, the meaning of an expression is determined by a general rule governing its employment. Second, what is expressed in the utterance of an expression is determined by the particular circumstances on that occasion. In this paper, I attempt to vindicate Wittgenstein's apparent willingness to maintain both positions by arguing that they are not in tension and by rejecting arguments designed to show otherwise.

Item Type: Book Section
Additional Information: In this paper, I use the standard abbreviations for Wittgenstein's texts.
ISBNs: 9780230219687 (print)
Keywords: wittgenstein, language, linguistic, rule, context, contextualism, meaning
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
P Language and Literature > P Philology. Linguistics
ePrint ID: 79897
Date :
Date Event
22 January 2010Published
Date Deposited: 24 Mar 2010
Last Modified: 18 Apr 2017 20:12
Further Information:Google Scholar

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