The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

A "resolute" later Wittgenstein?

A "resolute" later Wittgenstein?
A "resolute" later Wittgenstein?
‘Resolute readings’ initially started life as a radical new approach to Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, but are now starting to take root as a way of interpreting the later writings as well – a trend exemplified by Stephen Mulhall’s latest book (2007), Wittgenstein’s Private Language, as well as by some recent work published in this journal (Hutchinson 2007; Harré 2008). In this paper I will show that there are neither good philosophical nor compelling exegetical grounds for accepting a resolute reading of the later Wittgenstein’s work. It is possible to make sense of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method without either ascribing to him an incoherent conception of ‘substantial nonsense’ or espousing the resolute readers’ preferred option of nonsense austerity. If my interpretation is correct, it allows us to recognize Wittgenstein’s radical break with the philosophical tradition without having to characterize his achievements in purely therapeutic fashion.
wittgenstein, therapy, resolute reading, nonsense, illusion, private language argument, reductio ad absurdum arguments
0026-1068
649-668
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8

Schönbaumsfeld, Genia (2010) A "resolute" later Wittgenstein? Metaphilosophy, 41 (5), 649-668. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01664.x).

Record type: Article

Abstract

‘Resolute readings’ initially started life as a radical new approach to Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, but are now starting to take root as a way of interpreting the later writings as well – a trend exemplified by Stephen Mulhall’s latest book (2007), Wittgenstein’s Private Language, as well as by some recent work published in this journal (Hutchinson 2007; Harré 2008). In this paper I will show that there are neither good philosophical nor compelling exegetical grounds for accepting a resolute reading of the later Wittgenstein’s work. It is possible to make sense of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method without either ascribing to him an incoherent conception of ‘substantial nonsense’ or espousing the resolute readers’ preferred option of nonsense austerity. If my interpretation is correct, it allows us to recognize Wittgenstein’s radical break with the philosophical tradition without having to characterize his achievements in purely therapeutic fashion.

Text
A_Resolute_Later_Wittgenstein.pdf - Version of Record
Restricted to Repository staff only
Request a copy

More information

Submitted date: January 2010
e-pub ahead of print date: 15 October 2010
Published date: October 2010
Keywords: wittgenstein, therapy, resolute reading, nonsense, illusion, private language argument, reductio ad absurdum arguments
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 80099
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/80099
ISSN: 0026-1068
PURE UUID: c246d4ef-75a7-4931-8638-15f86511154c

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 24 Mar 2010
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 00:35

Export record

Altmetrics

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×