PBFT vs proof-of-authority: applying the CAP theorem to permissioned blockchain

Abstract

Permissioned blockchains are arising as a solution to federate companies prompting accountable interactions. A variety of consensus algorithms for such blockchains have been proposed, each of which has different benefits and drawbacks. Proof-of-Authority (PoA) is a new family of Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus algorithms largely used in practice to ensure better performance than traditional Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT). However, the lack of adequate analysis of PoA hinders any cautious evaluation of their effectiveness in real-world permissioned blockchains deployed over the Internet, hence on an eventually synchronous network experimenting Byzantine nodes.
In this paper, we analyse two of the main PoA algorithms, named Aura and Clique, both in terms of provided guarantees and performances. First, we derive their functioning including how messages are exchanged, then we weight, by relying on the CAP theorem, consistency, availability and partition tolerance guarantees. We also report a qualitative latency analysis based on message rounds. The analysis advocates that PoA for per- missioned blockchains, deployed over the Internet with Byzantine nodes, do not provide adequate consistency guarantees for scenarios where data integrity is essential. We claim that PBFT can fit better such scenarios, despite a limited loss in terms of performance.

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Identifiers

ORCID for Stefano De Angelis: orcid.org/0000-0002-1168-9064

ORCID for Leonardo Aniello: orcid.org/0000-0003-2886-8445

ORCID for Federico Lombardi: orcid.org/0000-0001-6463-8722

ORCID for Andrea Margheri: orcid.org/0000-0002-5048-8070

ORCID for Vladimiro Sassone: orcid.org/0000-0002-6432-1482

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