Combinatorial Markets for Efficient Electricity Management
Penya, Y.K. and Jennings, N. R. (2005) Combinatorial Markets for Efficient Electricity Management. In, International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, Compiegne, France, , 626-632.
The deregulation of the electricity industry in many countries has created a number of marketplaces in which producers and consumers can operate in order to more effectively manage and meet their energy needs. To this end, this paper develops a new model for electricity retail where end-use customers choose their supplier from competing electricity retailers. The model is based on similtaneous reverse combinatorial auctions, designed as a second-price sealed-bid multi-item auction with supply function bidding. This model prevents strategic bidding and allows the auctioneer to maximise its payoff. Furthermore, we develop optimal single-item and multi-item algorithms for winner determination in such auctions that are significantly less complex than those currently available in the literature.
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Physical and Applied Science > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
|Date Deposited:||10 Aug 2005|
|Last Modified:||02 Mar 2012 12:59|
|Contributors:||Penya, Y.K. (Author)
Jennings, N. R. (Author)
|Further Information:||Google Scholar|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
Actions (login required)