A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Market Selection Strategies for Competing Double Auction Marketplaces


Shi, Bing, Gerding, Enrico H., Vytelingum, Perukrishnen and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2010) A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Market Selection Strategies for Competing Double Auction Marketplaces. In, 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS2010), Toronto, Canada, 14 - 18 May 2010. , 857-864.

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Description/Abstract

In this paper, we propose a novel general framework for analysing competing double auction markets that vie for traders, who then need to choose which market to go to. Based on this framework, we analyse the competition between two markets in detail. Specifically, we game-theoretically analyse the equilibrium behaviour of traders' market selection strategies and adopt evolutionary game theory to investigate how traders dynamically change their strategies, and thus, which equilibrium, if any, can be reached. In so doing, we show that it is unlikely for these competing markets to coexist. Eventually, all traders will always converge to locating themselves at one of the markets. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that sometimes all traders converge to the market that charges higher fees. Thus we further analyse this phenomenon, and specifically determine the factors that affect such migration.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Additional Information: Event Dates: 14th-18th May
Divisions: Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
ePrint ID: 268467
Date Deposited: 04 Feb 2010 13:51
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 20:15
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/268467

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